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II'l'RODUOTIOI
IS THE SOIENTIFIO BEHAVIORIS'l' SCIENTIFIO?
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the claim
of Behaviorism.

Ills Scientific Behaviorism Seientific?·

or, a.

the Behaviorist claims, more scientific than any other psychology:
As the Behaviorist has redefined many of the traditionaJ
terms, such as ·Seience, Postulate, and Movement,· considerable
space has been devoted to a d,iscuss ion of these fundamental notions, for it is precisely here that there seems to be a radical
parting of the ways.
It will be evident from this discussion that BehaviorisD
is a Monistic, Materialistic, and Mechanistic Science.

Accord-

ing to it, Man is a physical, electroprotonic machine.

Profes-

sor 18iss has been extensively quoted in this thesis, for he appears to be the most able and the most explicit defender of Behaviorism in the world of science.

OHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS

Behaviorism professes to
man behavior.

be

a scientific study of

h~

Scientific Behaviorism asks: "Can the facts of

human behavior be studied scientificallY?"

The professed Be-

haviorist dec lares:
II Tradi tional psycho logy through introspection,
and philosophy through speculation, have given
the study of the individual a status which has
practica.lly removed it from the domain of natural sciences." I

In order to understand well this objection of the BehaViorist,
it will

be

necessary to investigate these fundamental notions.
1. THE PROBLD

The problem and subject proper of this thesis is formulated. interrogatively: "Is scientific behaviorism scientific?"
Before we can answer, it will be necessary to define what the
psychologist and scientist and behaviorist understand by the
terms Science, Natural Science, Psychology, Traditional Psychology, and Behaviorism.
SOIENOI.

In the broadest sense, science or general

science is nothing more than accurate knowledge.

Kore strictI

science is general or it is not; lf general, it is philosophy,
if it ls not, lt is special science.

Special sclence llkewlse

may be distinguished: it ls elther speculative or it is not;
lf speculative, it dealS chiefly with sane theorles and pure
knowledge, but if practical, chiefly wlth the applicatlon of
those theorles to lndlvldual beings or beings in the conorete.
Theoretioal science deals with abstract knowledge, practical
with concrete knowledge.
NATURAL SCIENCE.

Slnce scienoe is accurate knowledge,

na,tural science is accurate knowledge of nature.

Aocording to

Whetham: "Natural science is ordered knowledge of natural phenomena and of the relations between them.· 2 Such knowledge is
evidently theoretical or speculative.

But speculative science

may be either mental or it may not: if it is mental l it is either metaphysics or mathematics, and this type does not deal
with the individual primarily; if it is not purely mental, it
ls called natural science, for lt has for its object of study,
na ture or natura 1 beings as such.
When the term 'Sclenoe" ls used today it generally refers to sclence in the strlotest sense, namely, natural sclence,
or as some sclentists S8.y, science proper.

Besides being

COD-

trasted with mental scienoe, natural science is opposed today to
"non-science" or "unnatural scienoe" by progressive ·scientists"
who do not recognize anythlng above matter, that is, anything
immaterial or spiritual.

These scientlsts, who call themselves

Materialistic Monists, employ the terms SCienoe, Natural Science

4

or Physical Science synonymously with Science of sensible entities.

To them all science. worthy of the nS.me is Material Sci-

ence.

This is Science in the strictest sense, todayts extra-

scholastic science in the common acceptance of that

ter~

Because the Behaviorist professes to be a Materialistic
Monist, he is opposed by scientists who recognize in human nature two elements, body and vital principle or soul.

These

soientists use the terms Science, Physical Science, or Natural
Soienoe in a wider sense, to include the whole of human nature,
its spiritual component as well as its material oomponent.
They maintain, that if natural soience of the human individual
is to be adequately conceived and worthy of the name, it must
inc l.u.de his who Ie nature, not merely his material component or
body.

In our investigation, therefore, we must and shall here-

after use such terms in the wider sense, as understood by these
Dualists.
PSYCHOLOGIES.

Traditional psyohologyhas defined Psy-

oho logy as the study of the soul, and therefore proceeded to
study the soul, and this by the most convenient and effective
method, introspection.

But such a psyoho1ogy waS aocused of

being too subjeotive, too introspective.

It oannot be denied

that Titohenerism was a "reductio ad absurd.WI" of the introspective method.

Watson, the rather of Behaviorism, rightly

protested, and rendered experimental psyoh01ogy invaluable service in redirecting psychological investigation

by

insisting

upon beginning with the concrete objeot, a.nd making all results

5
congruent with objective evidence derived from the physical object under investigation.

Aocording to Watson,

"Behavioristic psychology is a purely
objeotive branoh of natural soienoe. Its
theoretioal goal is the prediction and
control of behavior. Introspection forms
no essential part of its methods, nor is
the soientific value of the data dependent
upon the readiness with which they lend
themselves to interpretation in terms of
oonsciousness ••• Psychology is the science
of behavior. "3
Subsequent 1y to Wa,tson, the Behaviorists became acoustomed to
designate all psychologies before 1914, the year of foundation
of the Behavioristic School, as Traditional.
In this thesis, we shall restrict the term Traditional
Psychology to those Schools that define Psychology as "the
science of the individual human being," whether that being be,
according to Kiss Calkins, our se 1f, or another se l:f, another
human being besides ourselves.

Other definitions of Psychology

as "the study of conscious life or conscious processes" are
discarded by the Behaviorist as entirely unnecessary.

Never-

theless, for many modern psychologists Experimental Psychology
remains still a scienoe of immediate experience (erfahrungswissenschaft), or a science of feelings and perceptions studied
by direct or introspective methods.

With James, the Dualist

may 8ay:
npsychology is a natural SCience, that
is, the mind which the psychologist studies
is the mind of di8tinct individuals inhabiting definite pDrtion8 of a. real 8pace and of

6
a real time ••• To the psychologist, then,
the minds he studies are •. objects, in a
world of other objects. U'"
2. THE OPPONENTS

According to Daal1stic Psychology, the "subject matter
of psychology or the object with which it is directly concerned
is ~ conscious life, .. 5
BEHAVIORISK,

What is Psychology from the standpoint of

a Behaviorist? Let us hear Watson, who justly objected against
the unrealism of some of his contemporaries, and courageOusly
reso Ived to restore the human being back to reality and to
natural science:
"Throughout the preparation of this elementary text I have tried to write with
the human anima 1 in front of me. I have
put down on 11 thoSe things that any properlr trained individual can observe ••••
it does not take a psychologist qua psychologist to study human activity, but it
does take a trained scientist and one
trained along special lines •••• Until psychology recognizes this and discards everything which oannot be stated in the
terms of universal terms of SCience, she
does not deserve her p lacein the sun.
Behavior psychology does make this attempt for the first time ••••• lt teaohes
us to face the human being as he is and
to dea.l frank lr with him, •• :-U;- The Behaviorist is determined to be scientific, the
Dualist also, the Psycho logist and Scientist have the same intention.

What must a Scientist do to be scientific?

ditions must he oomply with in order to

be

What oon-

strictly and rigidl

7
scientific?

A scientist must:

1. Study the human being as he i8 -an object in realit,

by the process of Exact Observation.
2. Olassify the Facts of Observation.

3. Formulate a methodical order of procedure, or in
other words, formulate a Working HypotheSiS.

4. Verify this preconceived hypothesis by pertinent,
well-selected, methodical Experimentation.

5. Infer and formulate from experimental data, the
correct and precise Conc lpion.

6. State the result of investigation in universal
terms of Soience, whioh statement is a Scientific Law.

7. Arrange all in a logioally oonstructed System; the
resu It is Soienoe.
8. Desoribe his experimental methods in detail so that
they oan

be

verified under similar oonditions by another sci-

entist; for although it is possible "From one, learn all,- yet
in order to

be

rigorously sOientifio, we need at least two to

agree to establish a new sOience, or a newly-disoovered soientifio law.
THE STAIDPOIIlT OF THE BEHAVIORIST.

Watson is explioi t:

"The present volume does some violence to
the traditional classification of psychological topios and to their oonventional treatment. For example, the reader will find no
discussion of conSCiousness, and no reference
to such terms as sensation, perception, attention, will, i-.ge and the 11ke. These

,","

__----------------------------------------------------------1
terms are in good repute, but I have found
that I can get along without them both in
carrying out investigations and in presenting psychology as a system to my students.
I frankly do not know what they mean, nor
do I be lieve that anyone e lBe can use them
consistently. I have retained such terms
as thinking and memory, but I have carefully
re-def1ned them 1n coriformity with behavioristic psychology. It is po.sible to retain
attention, to re-define 6t and make it serve •
•••. 1 have not done so."
Let it be well noted here that Watson does not deny the
existence of consciousness, but he denies the serviceability of
consciousness in scientific psych010gy or Behaviorism; in other
wordS, Watson prescinds agnostically from consciousness.

Such

a position is perfectly licit for a sCientist, provided he rema,ins faithful to his point of view, and does not deny the existence of a personal experience and fact, than which nothing
is more certain.

Does the Behaviorist make that illicit trans-

ition from prescision to denial?

We shall see.

Another contemporary psychologist, Albert Paul Weiss,
Professor of Psychology at Ohio State UniverSity, is a fra,nk
exponent and expositor of Behaviorism.

He says:

"With reference to the work of the two
psychologists most frequent lJ identified
with the behaviorist point of view, ¥ax F.
Keyer and John B. Watson, I believe I am
in complete agreement on essentials. "7
In developing this thesis, the present writer will often consult Prof. Weiss, because his work is recent and well
stated.

He posits the issue between Behaviorism and all the

other known psycho logies in no uncertain or ambiguous terms.

~-------------------------------------------------------,
9

3. THE ISSUE.
Aocording to Weiss, the issue or the 11ne of battle
between Behaviorism and other Psychologies is clearly defined.
"The issue, it seems to me, oan be
formulated as, l!. is!. ooncept of mind 2.I.
oonsoiousness ~ necessary concept !a ~
scientific investigs.tion of human behavior
~ hums.n achievelllent?a! But according to the dualistio definition of Gruender,
who defined Psychology as the study of conscious life, consciousness would seem to include the whole sUbject matter of
psychology.

In other words, for the Dualist consciousness is

indispensable in his Experimental Psychology, whereas for the
Behaviorist consciousness is unnecessary or even a hindranoe.
There is not the least shadow of doubt about these contradiotory pOSitions, of which one must most certainly be wrong. Is
the position of the Behaviorist as expressed by Weiss correct?
"Behaviorism claims to render a more
complete and a more soientifio account or-the totality of human achievement without
the conception of consciousness than traditional psychology Is able to render with
it."9 (Italics by Weiss.)
William James agrees with Professor Gruender.

In his

first chapter entitled the "Scope of Psychology," he defines:
"Psychology is the Science of Mental
Life, both of its phenomena and of their
conditions." IO
And again, beginniDg his treatment of the methods of
psychological investigation, he writes in italics:

-

10

"Introspecti?e Observation is what we
have to rely on first and foremost and
ar.ays•••• Everyone agrees that we there
(in our minds) discover states of consciousness •••• I regard this belief-ai
the funda,mental of all the postulates
of Psychology. "11
BEHAVIORISM IS ANOTHER PSYCHOWGY WITHOUT A SOUL.
According to the Behaviorist quoted, Behaviorism oppose
Traditional Psychology contra.dictorily.
this opposition consist?

Precisely in what doe.

Weis. is crystal-Clear:

"Much of what is written, both syste~
atic and experimental, is an attempt to
give both a mentalistic and a behavioristic~ount."12

Olearly, the Behaviorist distinguishes between mind
and not-mind, between Behaviorism and Mentalism or Traditional
Psychology, between a Psyoho1ogy whioh admits mental prooesses,
oonsoiousness, introspection, and Behaviorism which ignores the
for scientifio reasons.

The Behaviorist firmly believes that

further progress in psyohology is possible soientifica1ly only
on the necessary condition that oonsciousness be deleted from
the psychologist's point of view and vocabulary.

ror that rea-

son he maintains a rigid, non-menta.l, ma,terialistio standpoint.
As we have seen, James regards oonsciousness as "the
fundaments,l of all the postulates of Psycho logy."

Since James

introduces postulates, sinoe no soience oan do without

post~

ls,tes, since postu lates are not clearly understood nor olearly
defined, and since the entire final third of Weiss' 452-page
text-book is devoted to the POSTULATES OF BEHAVIORISM, it i8

11

absolutely essential to define olearly the role of postulates in
all scienoes, and in particular in Psychology and Behaviorism.
We are further encouraged to devote some time to the clarification of postulates because Weiss demands definitions, and declares tha,t he is firmly convinoed the woeful state of modern
psychology is due to lack of definitions of fundamental notions.

11

OHAPTER II
FUNDAMENTAL OOBTRADIOTORT POSITIOBS
1.' POSTULATES.
Let us make a few general remarks on the necessity of
postulates, that will resolve many misconceptions.

A recent

wri ter has well sWllll8xized the essentials:
"A postulate is a premise which a given science
assumes as proved. It is a starting point. Bot
on 1y can it b41 proved, but it has been proved. To
prove it again would be a waste of time and energy; to prove it again would be unscientific; to
prove every postulate again would be so to limit
and restrict human endeavor that progress in any
of the sciences would be impOssible ••••
There must be postulates. Everyday action demands them; no science can be without them. IOreover, 1t is useless to admit the necessity of postulates and then fail to use them in any given
science. "1.3
THE POSTULATE

or

BEHAVIORISM.

What is the rOCk-bottom,

funda.mental postulate upon which the whole superstructure of
Behaviorism rests?

It is Scientific Mechanism. Upon scientific

mecha.nism, Behaviorism places all its trust, its security. Upon
this founds.tion it builds; if the foundation is inseoure, the
superstructure of Behaviorisll must collapse. In order tha.t

ther~

remain no doubt about the Behavioristio Postulate, we select th4
last of many similar conclusions and pronounoements from Wetss,
who c loses his book with this final statement:

13
"That these expressions are then paraded as
evidence of a concord between science~and some
narrow pleasure-pain theory of modern social
reform, fills the true scientist with consternation and doubt as to whether even the most
advanced thinke~s on social evolution have emerged sufficient'l7 from their uncritical Ii terary background to foresee some of the possibilities of human achievement when scientific
mechanism is taken aP a fundamental postulate
in human beha.!or."l~
It is a historical tact tha.t the behavioristic position
has been severely criticized by the Gestalt Psychologists of
Germany.

In our country also Behaviorism has encountered some

opposi tioD.

In his book HOld Errors and liew labels," Fulton J.

Sheen began his essay on 'The Soul and the !wi tchings ot Behaviorism" with this thesis:

'Man is a machine and the Behaviorists
are his prophets. 115
What kind of a machine is man? He is a reacting machine
But Dr. Watson does not call him that; he prefers the soientifi
and physical terminology.
mass~

He calls a human being a reaotion-

What is the reaction-mass?

abstraotiion cannot have a masS.

It is an abstraction, and an
Neither can the reactions of

a reaction-mass have mass; tor they are processes, and processes have no mass.
which move.

They are on17 movements, not the things

Walking or a walk can have no mass; it is the man

who walks that possesses the mass.

Anyway, Dr. Watson i8 con-

vinced that reaction-mass is all the psychology ever needed to
exp lain everything.
Strictly in logical sequence with Scientific Mechanis.

as a postulate 'is Darwinian Evolution as a oorollary.

And Dr.

watson aooording,"y lays a scientifically rejeoted oornel'-stone
upon a soientifioally untenable foundation.

Be begins his book

entitled "Behaviorism, an Introduction to COmparative Psycholog
with this proclamation:

"The Behaviorist reoognizes no dividin

line between man and brute •• 16 He means there is no missinglink any more; at least, the Behaviorist does not reoognize or
admit any such conneotion.
If man and brute are maohines, what kind of machines
are they?

Besides being internal oombustion engines, they are

reflex machines, whose aotivity we oall Behavior.

Weiss

s~

ma,rizes watsonian Behaviorism in his chapter on Oondi tioned
Reflexes: "Behavior oonsists of ohained reflexes, whioh may
simple or ,oonditioned. ,,17

be

Thebehavioristio objeotive method

is founded prinoipally on the Oonditioned Reflex, that is , a
response is oonditioned when attached to a stimulus that did
not originally arouse it.

But exoeption has been often taken

to the oonditioned'reflex, and so we ask: "Is it a rea,l reflex,
one not involving oonsoiousness? And if you admit consoiousness
whioh you have disc07ered to be unneoessary and have rejeoted,
you manifestly oontradiot yourself.

U

And so Soientifio Behav-

iorism would seem to hold an unsoientifio position.
THE POSTULATE

or

TRADITIONAL PSYOHOLOGY.

Opposed to

Darwinian, evolutionary, soientifio meohanism, is soientifio
individualism, whioh renders man an ensouled, thinking animal,

1

~

possessing a unitary human nature.

This scientific individual-

ism or moderate realism or soholastic dualism is an ever-presen
foe to Darwinian, evolutionary, soientific mechanism.
the basis for its objection?

What is

The Scholastio psyohologist de-

clares that if the Scientific Behaviorist takes evolutionary
scientific mechanism based upon Darwin's untenable and discarde
theory as his fundamental postulate, that Scientifio Bebavioris
is ipsO facto unsoientifio.

Why?

'!'be Scholastio soientifioall

proves that any postulate of unilinear evolution from the inorganic to the organio and rational realms is no postulate, not
even a good theory or reasonable hypothesis, and is only worthy
of the name, "Gratuitous Assumption.

It

He deo lares that postu-

lates are only real postulates when they are proved premises,
not hypotheses or dogmas.
UNILINEAR, DARWINIAN and MECHANISTIC EVOWTION, however,
must not be discarded, oannot be disoarded, even if untenable.
This is the position of the Scientific Behaviorist.

Be must

retain it or else go out of business} He must ·postulate" his
organiC evolution of man from a primitive non-living, nebulous
mass, of evolutionary life from non-life, of man from the ape,
the ape from the lizard, the lizard from the slime of the earth,
the slime of the earth from a nebulous mass.

Such evolution of

electron-proton configurations from the nebulous mass, the ulti
mate principle, is to modern soience an absolutely necessa.ry
postulate.

16
If Darwinian Evolntion i8 a postulate aocording to the
soientific Behaviorist, it has been taken as a starting prinolple for Behavlorism, and need not be proved by Psychology, bu
by the scienoe from which it had been borrowed, that is, Anthr
po logy.

Now the same question arises:

"Has Anthropology prove

soientlfica,lly that men originated from the ape which in turn
orlginated ultima,tely from the primeval ooze?"
MODERN UNSCIENTIFIC SCIENCE.
deolared:

In 1911, Sir Arthur Keith

"The Neanderthal type represents the stock from whic

all modern races have arisen. uL~ But in 1916, in his "The ~
tlquity of Man," embodied in his ohapter on Conclusions, Sir
Arthur Keith makes the following

~ecantation:

nWe are compe11e

to a.dmi t that men of the modern type had been in existenoe long
before the Neanderthal type. n1 7
It is an undeniable, easily verifiable historical fact
that world history, the history of natural solenoe, and espe"'":.
cially Anthropology form one long oonsistent refutation of the
Darwinian Theory of constant and inevitable progress.

Is it

sCientiflc, then, for the Scientific Behaviorist to maintain
such a disoarded, untenablt theory for his basio postulate in
Beha,viorism?

Is it scientifiC, therefore, for the Amerioan

Association for the Advanoement of Science to make the following dictatorial proclamation:

uThe evidence in favor oftha

evolution of man is sufficient to convince every scientist in
19
the world."! This is a ridiculous edict, unsupported in realit

17
or bolstered up by analogous objective evidence; for "Paleontology tells us nothing on the subject - it knows no ancestors of
man... 19

this is a contradictory scientific attitude.
"The on~ statement consistent with her
dignity, that Science can make, is to say
that she knows nothing about the origin of
man. "20
This scientific conclUSion and proclamation was true in

1902; it is true for this our day, for true science ever remain
true, yesterday, today, and forever.
Why, then,this unscientific attitude regarding organic
evo 1ution of the Darwinian type on the part of many scientists?
Why does A. L. Iroeber, in his text-book entitled 'Anthropology

begin the first sentence of the first chapter as foll1 .. :
"Anthropology is the science of Man,H and then promptly entitle
his second chapter, "Fossil Man," and begin here with that old
and discarded fable, "The Kissing LLnk"?2l

Why does he again

reiterate that pet assumption of "The Missing Link," that theory which was conceived by a wish of an agnostic, delivered by
an atheist, mothered

by

hundreds of materialistic scientists

who iterated and reiterated a wish and a theory, which matured
into a "fact" of SCience, and when disproved, blossomed out int
a "dogma" of SCience, and in our day flowered into this:

"Xo

modern zoologist has the laSt doubt as to the general fact of
organic eTo1ution."

OrganiC, unilinear evolution is the angel

of light of modern scienceJ

Do we wonder why no progress worth

mentioning has been made in SCience, when it is based on this

IS
"scientifiC" assumption, organic evolution. ~ !!. Darwin?
"Oonsequently anthropologists take as their
starting-point the belief in the derivation of
man from some other animal form. There is also
~ question as to where in a general way man's
ancestry is to be sought••• namely, among the
Primates, the, various monkeys a~d apes. 1122
The italics are mine to emphasize the unscientific attitude of some modern scientists.
IS THIS A MAOHINE AGE IN SOIENOE?

If science is real

and universa,l, why does not a Darwin see with the eyes of an
Abbot Mendel?

Why does not na.tural science have in the eyes of

all scientists that objective reality and validity with which i
is endowed?

Is it because these scientists first form a pet,

mechanical theory, and then not by natura.l selection, but by an
artificial, unscientific selection all their own, seek for only
those facts which substa.ntiate somewhat their own theory, and
blind themselves to all other pertinent facts?

Is it because

they must wail with the evolutionary mechanist, Darwin, the wail
of one who adhered not wisely but too well, who adhered exclusively to the monistic and materialistic viewpoint:
"My mind seems to have become a kind of
machine for grinding general laws out of a
large collection of facts ... 23
'
Let the scientific behaviorist beware, let him who professes organiC, physico-chemical, electro-protonic, mechanically
reflex, "tota in toto and tota in qual1bet parte" evolutionary
SCience, bewareJ
to it - no moreJ

You get out of a machine only what you put in-

19
HISTORIO rAOTS.

What are the facts since 1S59?

It is

a historic fact that the theory of organic
"••• evolution has brought us materialistic
monism, in whose barren soil nor faith, nor
idealism, nor morality, nor art, nor any of
the finer things of life can thrive."2~
And neither can nor did natural science thrive in such an unnatural field, neither can scientific enlightenment be enkindled at the torch of

ho~ess-

night of organic evolution with

its monistic conception of an animalistic man.

From the stand-

point of SCience,
"Darwin's doctrine on the bestial origin
of man brought no other gain to natural scienoe than the addition of one more unverified hypothesis to its already extensive
stock of unfounded specula.tions. -25
OONSEQUENOES OF DARWINIAN "POSTULATE.

II

Now Je t the

Scientific Behaviorist scientifica.ll1' and Sincerely a,sk himself
"Is my funds.mental postulate for Behaviorism, postulating orgenic and mechanical evolution, not a postulate at all, but onl
an unverified and unverifiable hypothesis?"

Too long has this

plausible yet blinding doctrine with its pro l1fic progeny of
eXB.ggerations, misrepresentations, and plausible formulations
met with an all-too-readY credence on the part of unquestioning
SCientists, who did not or perhaps could not discrimina.te betwee
a. theory or hypothesis and a postulate, who after Darwin accept
ed all too readily and unquestioningly an unscientific
as demonstrated beyond all Shadow of doubt.

post~at

Today, in 1935, we

see all too clearly that the solid gain to natural science from
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the dootrine of Darwinian organio evolution has 'been neg1igibl
but the oonsequent Dark Age in Soience has 'been unquestionably
worse than the Dark Age from the 5th to the gth Century; for
then there was onlY the darkness of ignorance, which needs but
Light to rep lace it.

Today we have Error, which is Darkness

darkening Darkness, whioh is so many scientists is so impenetrable and unapproachable tha.t it is almost beyond. the possi bi1i ty of scientific en llghtenment.
CONSEQUENCES OF BEHAVIORISTIC l4ECHAHIOAL POSTULATE.
With this postulate of Mechanical Organic Evolution, the Behaviorist has had the temerity to "esta.blish" the postulates for
the Behavioristic scienoe of

Ethios~

Let him

beware~

Today

Marxian Socia11sm and tile Reigh of Terror of Communism is also
called "scientifio" for no other reason than that it too is
based upon "pure" materialistio evolution.

Today Behaviorism

also is called soientific for no other apparent reason than
that it combated the unsoientific and exteeme Titchenerism and
Introspectivism, and beoause it based its stand upon nothing
else than materialistio evolution.

Its reign of terror, sinoe

1914, ca.used the Great War in Soienoe: Its deadly doctrines are
eo revolutionary and revolting to nature and natural science
and. natural ethic. that even the Behaviorist himse If confesses:
the public mind is not yet prepared
to receive thea, and must first be
properly educated to accept them. •• tt26

fI • • •

to accept them in the Behavioristic "scientifio" spirit.
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REOAPITULATION THUS FAR:
The theoretica,l basis of individual and social behavior
aooording to the Behaviorist is evolutionary scientific mechanislI, of which the ultima,te elements are electrons and protons.

!bis is the fundamental principle, this is the basic assumption.
I repeat, Behaviorism is built upon the evolution of man from
electrons and protons, andffrom nothing else.
According to the Behaviorist, he is contradictorily opposed by all and to all previous psychologies, which he calls
Traditional Psychology, which does include Popular Psychology,
Soientific Psychology before 1914, and all other psychologies
that postula,te an animistic basis for their study of human and
anima,l l:ehavior.

These all consider introspection as valid

experimental technique.
According to Professor WeiSS, it was his intention to
"scrutinize fundamental assumptions" and insist upon "some
degree of consistency in the development of the superstructure"
of psyCh010gy.2 7 This we have done; and we have come to the
following conclusion:

Since the fundamental assumption of

Unscientific Behaviorism has never been proved and yet has been
accepted a,S a Postulate, the superstructure of Unscientific
Behaviorism, no matter how imposing or attractive it may seem,
collapses.

The Scientific Behaviorist has been proved unsci-

entific in accepting the viewpoint that Man is a

physico-che~

1ca1, electro-protonic, organically evolved, mechanically reacting, reflexly behaving combustion engine.

2.2

2. DEFIIITIONS.
BEHAVIORISM DEFIDD.

We are now in position to exam-

ine the def ini t ion of Behaviorism.

Etymologically, Behavior-

ism would be the study of human behavior, of man's adjustment
or ada.ptation to his environment.

Prof. Weiss defines:

"From the standpoint of the writer,
behaviorism is the science that studles
the origin and development of those bodily movements (responses) of the individual which esta,blish his status in the
social organia.tion of which .e is a member. "28
The Tradi tiona,l psychologist of the Scho lastic School
would deem this definition inad.equ8,te unless the words "and
psychic" are included after "bodily," to represent the responses of the comp:e te individual.

But Prof. Weiss says:

"For the wri ter, '~haviorisJD in psychology is merely the name for that type
of investigation and theory which assumes
that mants educational, vocational, and
social activities can be compJe tely described or explained as the result of the
same (and no other) forces found in the
natural sciences."~9
Earlier in this thesis, we have carefully defined what
is commonly accepted by the term "Natural Science."
by

But Weiss

this term limits hillse If only to sciences using"a measuring-

stick of wood or brass instruments.

Natural science, a,s under-

,to od

.~

scholastic psychology, means much more than that.

It

.HI-XlS

studying na,ture wholly and accura,tely, so that soientific

knowledge may be gained and verified by whoever wishes to do so
at whatever time and place he wishes to do so, if he provide on
11 identioal experimental oonditions.

But the Behaviorist will

not fa,ce everyday facts of human experienoe, and must c ling to
pet theories and unscientifiobeliefs:
"For the writer behaviorism represents,
as it does for many others, a protest aga,inst all attempts to explain human aohievement by the introduction of an element which
is beyond the ra.nge of the physical measurement. I be lieve ths.t human achievement is of
the same order as the inorganic and organic,
prooesses which Brevail in the physico-che~
ical universe. "3
EVidently here we have the point of departure between
behaviorism and scho lasticism.

The beha.viorist himself plainly

realizes that no U41iformi ty can 'be reached in such a oontroversial and contradiotory atmospb3 re.
points of the opponents; but

He summarizes the view-

unfo~tunately,

like many non-pht-

losophioal scientists, he fails to distinguish between a postulate, which can be proved and has been proved and upon which a
less fund.a,mental science buildS, and a hypothesis which has not
been proved.

These are. his own words:
"There are two types of postulates accor6ing to which human behavior and human achievement can be explained: (1) Physical causation,
according to which human achievement is the
product of nothing but the physical processes
and structures which make up the body and the
environment, and in which the sole datum of
existence is the electron-proton totality;

(2) Psychical causation, according to which
human achievement is the product of some
entity which is not completely describable
under the electron-proton assumptions. "31
Too many hypotheses in the dress of postulates, and beliefs
which are merely subjecti'Ve longings have been expressed by
the Scientific Behaviorist. Let us conolude this passage with
another citation from the Scientific Behaviorist, Weiss, in
which enough beliefs are expressed to make of Behaviorism not
8.

Science but a Religion, the Religion of Mechanica.l llvolution:
•
"I believe that eventually psyohology will
be reoognized as an interlocking segment
through which the social sciences will become
e.n extension of the natural sciences. As an
educa.tional problem our who Ie conception of
science will probably ohange. Physioal soience has not serious~ interfered with traditional beliefs of either the educated or ~
eduoated; biologioal soience and the theory
of organio evolution in partioular has been
widely aocepted by the eduoated and is begining to be aocepted by the uneduoated; the
sooial scienoe of the future will introduce
the conoeption'of sooial evolution whioh will
brand as illusion and error a much greater
pel'oentage of long oherished beliefs and
id.eals, but this sacrifice is now scarcely
anticipated by the educated and is entirely
unsuspected by the masses of mankind. "32
With such a platform Behaviorism olaims to be

and only psychology.'
ma,ke them unnecessaryJ
oult unguided

by

~

one

It olaims to displace a.l1 others, to
This is not sCienoe, this is a oode or

objeoti'Ve evidenoe.

Behaviorism violates its

own code from the very beginning. It dema~s objectivism, and
yet passes judgment promisouously, and uses but one touchstone
for all its judgments-the magic word, :MATTER.

If it is not

'25
.at ter , it is wrong, it is inadmissible.
it be noted,

~ priori~

There exists nothing but Matter.

Beoause Behaviorism says soJ
the physioal world.

Absolutely, and let

Its only

obje~tive

Why?

knowledge is

This is opinion or madness, but not scienc

A SUMMARY CONTRASTING UNSCIENTIFIC BEHAVIORISM AND
SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY.

Let it be noted clea.rly:

1. Behaviorism rests upon the theory of unsoientific
evolution; experimental traditional psychology upon the faot
of a vital, organizing and unifying principle, the souL
2. Behaviorism seeks to explain all by the evolving
and gyrating configurations of electrons and protons; although
Traditional Psyohology admits moderate evolution restricted to
definite orders of beings, scientifically it

m~st

deny that

evolution is an adequate explanation of all the phenomena and
experimental findings in psychology.

3. Behaviorism posits sooial evolution due to intrinsio changes in the configuration of complex electron-proton
oombinations; Traditional psychology admits social evolution,
but oannot scientifically admit the evolution of that fundamental unit of society, the individual human nature.
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3. OBJECTIVES.
PURPOSE OF nISS AND PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS IDENTIOAL:
AThis book is an attempt to bridge over the
gaps between traditional, popular, and behavioristic psychology by showing their interre lations. The underlying p Jan of the book
is to present fundamental principles of behaviorism as the writer sees them, and to
compare them with the most important conceptions in traditional subjective psychology
and the sociological systems that are based
upon it. 1133
After pointing out that Titchenerism was traditional
subjective psychology, and that Scholastic or Neo-Scholastic
psychology is subjectively and objectively SCientific, we subscribe to the noble purposes expressed by Professor Weiss.
CONTRADICTORY POSITIONS.

The Behaviorist maintains:

"Thus, in the last analysis, human behavior
is reduced to movements between electron-proton
systems, but this reduction is the final aim of
all scientific investigation. As an expedient
in social co-operation, the behaviorist specializes in the study of those complex forms of motion, which, for want of a better classificatio~
are designated as the personal, domestic, profesSional, publip, moral, esthetic, scientific
activities. 1f3~
But the Scholastic psycho logist mainta.ins: Human behavior is ultimately reduced to movements of the soul, which
cannot be reduced to electron-proton systems.
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These positions contradict one another; consequently,
both cannot be

right~

STATE or THE QUESTION.

That man or beast or plant is

a particular systematic configuration or electron-proton pattern can be a,dmi tted; that man or other living being possesses
a vital principle as a unifying principle is only admitted by
the scho lastic and popular psychology.
That this vital principle is not demonstrable direotly
by wooden measuring-stioks or brass instruments or other material instruments of preCision, is universally admitted; that
it, therefore, is nonexistent is generally affirmed and taken
for granted by non-soho lastic psychologists, and just as insistently denied by the scholastiC, as an unwarranted, indemonstrable, unscientific conclusion, based upon preconceived
theories.
rinally, Neo-Scholasticism and Scientific Psychology
maintain that Behaviorism, with oversimplification, with the
building up of complioated patterns of behavior by the integration of simple reactions,

by

seeing only stijuli and re-

sponses and enchanted by its magic formula, B-R, expreSSing
nothing but conditioned and unconditioned reflexes, it oan
never scientifically and adequately aohieve its purpose and
a,rrive at its objective.
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CHAPTER III.
MONI8l( vs. DUALISM.
1. HUllAS EEHAVIOR AND PHYSICS.

BEHAVIORISJ( AND PHYSICS.

Thus far we have seen that

Behaviorism is seriously attempting to make the psychology of
human behavior, to make a non-mathema,tical science mathematical
to make the psychical aspect of human behavior physical, and to
identify the physical with material.
fect only of a physical force?
may

be

Or is there a,nother force that

negatively expressed as a non-physical force and posi-

tively expressed as a psychical force?
it not

Is human behavior the ef-

be

If it does eXist, .ust

recogni zed in order that human behavior may

be

ad-

equately and scientifically suudied?
Is human behavior the result of a physical force only?
The Scientific Beha:viorist c Jaims "scientificallT" that it is.
But to establish this claim scientifically, he must reduce all
human activity or behavior to one physical or material principle of activity, to the Energy of Physics.
impossible task

~prima

He is attempting an

facie, for it is clearly evident that

physical matter as studied by Physics, is dead and lifeless and
killed if previously alive, and therefore can never give an ad-
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','lus te explanation of vital behavior.

Sinoe non-living phy-

.1 cal substanoes do not possess all of the following oharaoi

t,ristios of living oreatures, whioh are found speoifically in
each representative:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Dafini te size.
Definite shape.
Definite chemioaloomposition.
Dafini te organization.
5. Definite immanent aotivity - metabolism.
b. Definite reduplioation of itself - reproduotion.
7. Definite responses following with physioal but
not absolute neoessi ty - irritability;

therefore, a fortiori, human behavior, being a study of life
and of living aotivities, is entirely out of the soientifio
scope of physios, and oonsequently out of the realm of the
Monistio Behaviorist.
View of MECHANISTIC PSYCHOLOGIST and BEHAVIORIST.
"The SOientist, however, will regard the
physical eXp'lanation /eleotron-proton oonfigurations7 as the better working hypothesis, at It ast in his own field, al.though he
too may have oertain reservations as to the
adequaoy of physical oausation when he oonsiders such aotivities as morality, religion,
art, eto., in whioh he is on the Same level
with the poet or non-soientifio individual.
The behaviorist, however, is faoed with
the problem of desoribing humanlChievements
in the most aoourate and uniform of all
languages (mathematics). The traditional
spirit or psyohical conoeption oannot be
thus desoribed. -35
It is familiar and oommonplaoe history that Desoartes
a.ttempted to ma.ke philosophy, a non-mathematioal sOienoe,
thematioal.

m~

He, genius though he was, failed, for he attempted

the impossible.

Shall history and its Eailures be repeated?
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ARISTOTLE'S WARNING.

The Stagiri te cautioned subse-

quent generations that not all sciences can be 8xpected to
yield the same mathematical certitude that the metaphysical
science of mathematics can.

Over two thousand years ago, the

pythagoreans made the same mistake.

Shall we not learn from

their error and profit from Aristotle's admtnition?

Descartes

did not learn; he a.ttempted to make philosophy mathematical,.
and failed.

Neither is psychology mathematics.

If it is, then

Behaviorism and Psychology cease to be, cease to eXist, have
absolutely no claim to existenceJ

"Entia non sunt multiplicand

sine necessitate;" so Occam's razor would dispose of the Scientific Behaviorist.
Shall we or can we ever get mathematical certitude in
the study of human behavior?

Here is the opinion of Aristotle,

as paraphrased by that Aristotelian authority, W. D. Ross:
"We must be content to answer it with the
accuracy of which the SUbject-matter permits.
Ethics is concerned with 'things which are
for the most part so,, 'things whioh are capable of being otherwise,' and we must not expect in it the perfect demonstrations that
a.re possible for a SCience, which, like mathema.tics, deals with t things that are of neceSSity. '
Ethics reasons not from but to first prinCiples; it starts not with what is intelligible in itself but with wha.t is familiar to
us, i.e., with the bare facts, and works back
from them to the underlying reasons ••• Mathematics deale with a SUbject-matter the first
principleS of whioh are acquired by an easy
abstraction from sense-data; the substance of
mathematics is the deduction gf conclUSions
from these first princip]a s. ",,6
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This same sound opinion can be readily applied to the
, physiCal sciences and Beha,viorism.

We can never demand that the

element in human behavior will give us the metaphysical

~ariable

certitude of mathematics, or that Experimental Psychology and
Soientific Behaviorism is, must be, or ever can be Mathematics
cr Physics; for at tbat moment they would cease to be distinct
loiences.

Shall, then, the Bebaviorist maintain:
"When we are faced with the problem of
adopting a fundamental assumption toward
which the analysis of human behavior might
regress, the physicist's electron-proton
ultimate theory has the advantage,
(1) that it can be stated in tbe most
effective language responses (matbematics)
that have been developed;
(2) that it can be syntheSized into a,toms,
molecules, protoplasm, animals, man, Social
organization, and
(3) that it can be communica,ted from one
individual to another so that a uniformity
(verifiability) among the responses of many
individuals can be and has been established. 1137

He realizes the only other alternative that can explain
uma,n heha,vior, for he immediately continues:
"On the other hand, the ultimate realities
of the professional meta,physician, such as
'thing in i tse 1f ,,' ente lechy, e!an vi tal,
psychical force, are fictions which cannot
be measured, verified, or syntheSized into
anything more unified than is implied by the
term uniqueness, which can neither be demoa. strated nor defined. This is the reason why
I adopted the electron-proton type of bypathesis as best adapted for the study of human
behavior. N38
What an unscientific position the Scientific Behaviorist
maintains~

Since, as he says, the entelechy or psychical force
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~nnot be
~1onl

measured, it i8 not an ultimate reality, but a fic-

Anything that oannot be measurec!, synthesized a.nd thus

y.rified in a ohemioal labora.tory, is fiction for the Scientifi
B.hRviorist1

Love,

loya~ty,

for they cannot be measured

patriotism, must be fiotions, too,
i~

a ohemioal or physical laborato

Jloause the enteleohy, postulated as absolutely neoessary by a
.oientist, Driesoh, who dared to faoe the faots when he faced
the reality of the human being, and thereupon modified his theories to fit the faots, because the enteleohy of Aristotle, of
Aquinas, and of ho. .at,. 8c"ent:1fic psychology cannot be synthedr-ed or measured by ms.terial measuring-sticks, the Scientific
Behaviorist declares most unscientifically: "This is the reason
,hy I a.dopted the electron-proton type of hypotheSiS as best a4-

apted for the study of human behavior. "39 Such a starting principle that is clearly wrong in its germ can never germinate into truth subsequent lYe
How oan the Beha.viorist maintain such a narrow and reatricted and erroneous position regarding human behavior?

He

Ilistook a theory of biology for s, postulate of a stable soience
of human behavior.

This is bad scienoeJ

We have just indicated

that behavioristic logic, philosophy are, to say the least, ver
questionable.

How came it about that the Behaviorist accepts in

regard to human behavior, scientific mechanism, which is phySically mechs,nistic, anthropologically evolutionary!. !!. Darwin,
unreal, and therefore unscientific?

It is ultimately due to the

SCientifio revolt of Scienoe from Philosophy in the Sixteenth
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oentury.

Follow1ng upon the d1soover1es of Ga11leo and the

Rat1ona11sm of Sp1noza, the teleolog10al pr1n01ple aooount1ng
for man's or1g1n
"••• and of God's dealings with man, is replaoed
by the prinoip Ie of meohanism. Sc1enoe has now
beoome identified 1n men's minds w1th the quantitative laws of motion. The Oopern10an revolution had further emPhasized the meaning of the
meohanioal theory••~o
DEVOLUTION

or

MONISTIO SOIENOE.

From this time, it is

assumed that the prooesses of life may be desoribed as quantities of meohanioal foroe or energy.
ism, but not universal truth.

Th1s is universal meohan-

Suoh going baok to inanimate na-

ture to expla,in life and vital prooesses may be "soientifio"
naturalism, but it is unnatural soienoe.

Suoh a view of human

behavior ident ifies reality with this world, exp lioi tly maintains by "the who Ie world" noth1ng mor e than the sens1ble world
of ma,tter.

Yet such a point of v1ew is str10tly orthodox and

scientific aocord1ng to the Behaviorist, but it is quite

~

scientifio when 1ts subjeot-matter 1s human behavior, beoause
suoh

8,

realism exp11citly repudiates every spiritual or moral

reality.

And the fountain-head of this unscientifio realism is

the restricted view of So1enoe: "Sc1enoe is Physios," or again,
"Soienoe is Mathemat10s."
prepossession]

This 1s not a postulate, this is a

Whatever else it may be, it oerta1nlY is not

sOienoe.
Although the Dualist denies universal meohan1sm and
organio evolution, he does not deny all evolution.

But he does

.eny that these dogmas of the modern unscientific scientist are
Science, and that the Scientific Behaviorist has proved the fo
lowing facts by means of Darwinian organic evolution:
1. Origin of life from non-life.
2. Origin of anima 1 life from plant life.
3. Origin of human ~fe from animal life, i.e.,
from ape-life.
4. Origin of all human activities from matter alo
ThiS attitude of the Dualist is scientific.

But the following

atti tude is not:
~The combined implications of cosmic and
biological evolution have destroyed completely the foundations for the hypothesis
of human uniqueness or primac7.·~r

Professor Barnes is clearly not talking as a soientist
when he makes that statement.

Since when can conc lusions from

hypotheses be aocepted for verified facts?

Is it any wonder

that Professor Ryan of the Oatholic University objects:
"Evo lution is supposed to have made untenable
any theory about nature whioh is not rigorously
deterministic ••• and essentially materialistic••
It is to evolutionism as a philosophy that we
Object ••• How the truth of biological evolution
gives one the right to postulate that ab initio
everything was a primordial undifferentiated
mass of atoms, or that thought and ma.tter are
at bottom one and the same, or that noumenal
and phenomena,l are but aspects of a common rea Ii ty, or that human ethics is either a ma,tter
of conventiona or the result of economic determine,tiona, or that God i8 but the construction
of our own fear impulses---all of this has as
much to do with the results of biology as the
fantastic elephant which supported the fantastic tortoise which supported the world of Indian my tho-philosophy has to do with modern
physical science.·~2
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2. HOKAN BEHAVIOR AND PHYSIOAL MOTION
IS HUKAI BEHAVIOR PHYSIOAL MOTION ONLY?

What stand

does the Behaviorist maintain?
'When human behavior is studied as a form
of motion differing only in complexity from
the motions and dynamics of physics and mechanics, behaviorism assumes the systemat'ic
status of physical monism, of whioh electrons
and protons ha~e been acoepted as the ultimate elements. ".,,~ .
But human nature is coordinated in its activities, it
is oonsoious of an abiding entity during multiform reactions,
and this knowledge is immediate so that any possibility of error is excluded.

How does the Behaviorist account for this

unity midst multiplicity in human behavior?
"In adopting physical monism any conscious
or psyohical entity as distinct from the physical elecif;l."on-proton entity is, of course,
excluded. I q..
The Behaviorist does not account for-the human principle of unity a.midst the Dlultiplici ty of reactions; he simply
excludes, he does not explain.

Such is the sterility of Behav-

iorism which hopes to supplant Traditional

Psychology~

.

How does the Dualist meet this problem of individuali.ty
amidst multiplicity?
achievement?

What is the ultimate basis of all human

It is a soul, an individual soul for each organis

'nd the unifying principle of all its activity, that known and
illIllediately recognized abiding entity persisting through and
,aooounting for all human behavior and achievement.
and

yOU

Deny it,

accept an impossible contradiction, a million of inde-

pendent, individual cellular units organized by chance with a
production of billions of variegated, incoordinated

processes~

ThiS surely will not advance the scientific study of personalit
and social

organi~ation.

This is disorganization, chaos.

Weis

himself admit_ the difficulty, for it is inescapable.
HIn other words, I assume that the scientific study of what is generally known as
personality and social organization can be
conducted under the assumption that the physico-chemical continuum is the sole existential datum and that the totality of the electron-proton aggregates is the universe in
which we live. "'5
Explicitly, then, the Scientific Behaviorist while mainta.1ning
8

cont inuum denies individua.li ty of that continuum, denies per-

sonality, and

BO

affirms and denies that a thing is undivided

and d,ivided at the same time under the same conditions.

ThiEl

violates that most fundamental principle, the principle of
contradiction.

weiss realizes his untenable position, and

bravely attempts to ameliorate his irreconcilable, unscientific
behavior; then, finally, gives up the hopeless situation.
"Of course, I do not imply that human
achievement can now be reduced to the
electron-proton formulation. Nei~her is
this possible in physics itself.·~6
Truth must out.
imself of bain

The Scientific Behaviorist condemns

unscientific

intrinsically impossible will never become possible.
qualifies his admission.

impossib~
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It is impossible now, but perchance

it may be possible later, perhaps aeons later.
not save an

Yet he

situation.

But this will

Whatever is of its very na-

ture impossible, can never become possible, for not even the
Almighty ca,n ha,rmonizepcontrad_ictories.

If it were pOSSible,

scientific study, and therefore, Scientific Behaviorism would
be impossible, would be sheer nonsense.

But Professor Weiss

Is consistent and, loyal to his pet theory although he well
knows his precarious position and contemporary opposition:
"There are some eminent physicists
(Millikan, Lodge, Whitehead, Pupin)
who claim that the mechanical conception is inadequate."~7
And so end all of the explanations of human phenomena
under the tutelage of the Scientific Behaviorist.
explain.

They do not

That is the reason why Behaviorism has been known as

the Sterile Science.

Physics oan never tecome Psychology.

And so we conclude, in spite of the energe*io Behavior
ist, that physioal motion, phySical energy, the parallelogram
of forces, or in a word, the physical energetic theory of modern psychology, and particularly of Behaviorism, is entirely
inadequate to explain, or even begin to explLin vital phenomen
Now we are faced with the problem of discovering why
and how the Scientific BehaViorist has assumed such an unsoientific attitude, why he has been complicated and involved in
such an impossible scientific Situation.

HISTORIOAL REVIEW or

Aristotle originated

"ENERGY~"

the term "energeia," which, however, the modern psychologist
does not use in the same sense.

Energy to Aristotle meant

actual manifestation of any change, not merely physics,l or
material change.

The Power or Latent Potentiality was called

'd£namis;" the result of the change is what the Scholastimcall
"actus," or "act, II due to something "in energy, If or according
to Aristotle,
tlon:

"'en~rgeit.
, ,,'8

He gives the following illustra-

During the waking state, an act of knowing occurs

ally or "in energy," whereas during s

~ep

act~

there exists only the

"power" to know.
PHYSIOAL SOIENCE IMPROVES ON ARISTOTLE]

But physical

science appropria.ted these theoretical terms as her o'WflJ

The

result, too often forgotten, or perhaps never realized, is
evidently a superiority complex of unscientific manouvers. Here
are some of the evolutionary changes introduced into the hypothesis of mental energy, as first correctly conceived and definitely promulgated by Aristotle, and "modified" by later
"science: "
(1) rirst of all, this concept of energy became restricted to material phenomena.

Energy now claimed reference

solely to physical movements, but no longer concerned itself
with mental changes, as for example, in processes of knowing.
(2) Since the Reaaissance, potency and a.ot of the
\I

..

~

•

Scholastic, or the dunamis and energeia of Aristotle, have be-
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oome the Potential Energy and Kinetic Energy of the scienoe of
PhysiOS, a persistent entity, always identioally the same, at
one time latent, and. at another time manifest.
(3)

"The third ohange---and that whioh is of
the greatest importanoe for us s.t present--consisted in assuming this persistent energy
to be transferable from one thing to another. "49

And thus mental energy became by a process of evolution or devolution---neural energy}

Wm. MCDougall, for example, writes

rega,rding contemporary views as follows:
"The constituent neurones of the nervous
system with all their branches are regarded
as a vast system of channels in all parts of
which potential chemical energy is consta.ntly
being transformed, in virtue of the normal
vi ta.l activity of the neurones, into a particular form of active energy. "50
Let this disoussion suffice to trace the materialization of mental energy into physical energy.

By recognizing a

vi ta 1 principle distinot from ma.tter Aristotle

~orJtulated

his

his hylomorphio theory of matter and form, a.nd form he oalled
energy (energeia.); by disoarding a vital principle, or soul,
the materialistio soientist of today olings to his physical
Energetic Theory as suffioient to explain Psychological phenomena.
The next question, then, to be investigated is to discover whether any or all modern Physical Energetio Theories,
which are held by praotioally all non-soholastio sOientists,
including the Behavioristio psychologists, are sufficient to
eXplain human behavior with emphasis on psyohologioal phenomena.
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ENERGETIC THEORY

pr PHYSICS USELESS

.,R PSYCHIC AOTS.

Can any physical energetic theory explain psychological
phenomena?

¥odern psychologies have built up elaborate mathe-

eatical theories and ingenious physical "Energetic Theories"
for solving distinct problems of human behavior, as in the operation of knowlng.

They have strung together raw facts, dif-

ferent interpretation of these facts, and the outcome was a
host of Laws, not laws in the sense of PhYSics, but descriptions as of some puerile

science~

These psychological Jaws are

in the main truths which the common people know but which the
Unscientific Psychologists seem to have discovered for the firs
time.

Here are some fundamental "Laws" of modern Scientific

Psychology: 51
(~ A person has more or less power to observe
what goes on in his own mind. He can know that he
knows. (The Old ScholastiC called it "Reflection~)

(2) When a person has in mind any two or more
ideas, he has more or less power to bring to mind
any relations that essentially hold between the ..
This the modern psychologist calls the Eduction of
Relations. (It is "Judgment" for the Old ScholastiC.)

(3) Third and la.t law is the Eduction of the
Corre late s: When a person has in mind any idea
together with a relation, he has more or less power to bring up into mind the correlative idea.
yes, and the Old ScholastiC and Aristotle knew
and expressed this too.
But no highly technical scientific terminology, no
physical or physiological version of mental energy can Show
how an electron has the innate power to ref ~ ct upon i tsel!,
no Scientific Behaviorist dan demonstrate how an electron and
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proton oan eduoe such oorrelates, as, e. g., "father and son,"
Itrb ite and blaok," eto.

It

i~

true and undenia.ble, therefore, that often our

physiologioal energy is interrelated with psyohical energy, but
we must ma,intain when faoing real faots that in Some operations

often known

&.s

the higher funotions of the soul, the psyohical

energy is intrinsioally and essentially independent, as in such
abstract conoepts of "love and devotion," or in experienoes
with logical memory of transoendental relationships.
Likewise, without an abiding entity known by the
Scholastic as "Person" or the "Ego" it is impossible to aocount for the "mental span" required in a judgment or a oorrelation. There would be nothing whioh would do the oomparing,
the judging, or the oorrelating; surely, the unrelated protons
and eleotrons oould not do it.

And thus we are foroed to con-

clude by objeotive evidence and a sane consideration of all
the faots that discrete eleotrons and protons, behaving independently, absolutely independent of eadh other and integra,ted
by no unitary principle, ensouled by no vitalizing and energi zing prinoip Ie whose identity remains essentially oonstant,
can never account for nor adequately explain the higher cognitive prooesses by any energetic theory or hypothesis whioh
meinta.ins that mental energy "in toto" is nothing more than
physioal energy

It

in toto."

;. HOlUB SCHAVIOR AND DUALISJI

HYLOJlORPHIO THEORY.

We shall endeavor to utilize in

this discussion some of the general principles of modern and
contemporary psychology as a confirmation of Aristotelian a,nd
Scholastic scientific,psychology.

Recently Robert Woodworth,

Professor of Psychology at Oolumbia University affirmed:
NThe first principle of psychology is
contained in the definition (psychology
is the science of the activities of the
individual), and that the individual acts
a,s a unit. Without this fundamental prinCiple, often called the "organismic principle," it would be impossible to explain
anything in psychology. "52
Since the Scientific Behaviorist conceives man as a
combustion engine made up of a billion more or less individual
entities, and explicitly rejects this first principle of psycho logy, according to Woodworth, tha,t Behaviorist would find it
impossible to explain anything in psychology.

The sterility of

Behaviorism vindicates Professor WOodworth.
In his "Jlodern Jlaterialism and Emergent Evolution,N
published in 1929, Profeaaor I'm. JlcDougall analyzes the behavior of living bodies, and then enunciates a conclusion consona,nt to the objective evidence of experimental data:

"It appears on the face of it that the
living body is the'scene of events which
require for their explanation both mechanist ic and te leo logical princ iples. The
acceptance of such mixed principles for
living organisms is the essence of doctrines commonly called vitalistic. And
within the field of psychology or physiological psychology the acceptance of such
mixed principles is called dualism or
interactionism; for it implies the interaction of mechanistic and of teleological
or mental events. "53
MCDougall merely restates the old problem of unity in
due.li ty, which had been first recognized and solved aright by
Aristotle, and which can be solved today only by establishing
a similar Aristotelian hylomorphic theory in our study of
man behavior.

h~

To deny that natural events are not of two dis-

tinct orders, the physical and the mental, is not Science but
Nescience, is Folly, because it is a denial of undeniable fact.
Vital energy of two orders, mechanical and mental, demands in a living individual but one energizer or energist,
which Aristotle called Ente1echy54 and St. Thomas of Acquin,
the Prince of the Scholastics, called Form. 55

To avoid sub-

sequent misunderstanding, we shall the vital principle, soul
or ente lechy.
This is not a departure to Kedieyal or Ancient times.
As late as 1929, Hans Dr1esch in his "The Science and Philosophy of the Organism" uses the same terminology invented by
Aristotle.

And Hans Driesch knows whereof he speaksJ

He has

long 'studied animal behavior, he ana17zed the phenomena of life
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: and death, as was forced as a result of experimentation
"••• to conclude to a coordinating vital principle in living orgl!i,nisms absent in dead matter, for organic growth from a single fertilized ovum is othl~wise inexplicable---and so
is regeneration."~
But might not a machine located in the germinal Anlage
of Weissman save the position of the Scientific Behaviorist1
Driesch denies this possibility according to his own definition
of a machine:
"A machine is a typical configura,tion
of physical and chemical constituents by
the acting Qf whioh a typical effect is
attained. 115,
But how oan the meohanical conception account for
that wonderful phenomenon, regenera,tion?
s

fertili~ed

Divide, for example,

ovum; you obtain two completely evolved and deve-

loped organisms.

Divide a machine, and instead of getting two

machines, you get no machine.

Such reconstructive ability is

found only in living matter and must be of a non-mechanical nature.

And thus we conclude scientifically with Aristotle:
.. The soul or ente lechy is the princ ip Ie
or energizer in the vital processes of nutrition, sensation, intellection, and motivation.
"Broadly spit aking, the sOU1 iS the essence of a determined body. "56
II Therefore, the soul is the first aot
-of a natural body having life in potenoy."57
II The soul is the princip Je of nutri tion
sensation, intelleotion, and motivation.";!
"The soul i8 the prinoi~le by which we
live and feel and know. 115~
,

Aristotle built his Psychology on his Scientifio Biology}

OHAPTER IV.

GElfJ:RAL PSYCHOLOGY•

.le DEFINITIONS.
If we define psyohology as the soienoe of oonsoious
life, then we oan personally verify the following faots pSJaho logioally by means of internal observation, soientifioally
designated as the method of Introspeotion:
Nutritive prooesses are unoonsoious prooesses.
Sensitive prooesses are consoious prooesses in
whioh a speoialized organ is required.
(3) Intellectual prooesses are oonsoious prooesses
in whioh no organs are oonsoiously required.
During intelleotual prooesses we a,re not aware of the
6r~~

aotion no matter how intently we attend as we most sure-

ly are when we oonsciously attend to the prooesses aooompanying
a sensa,tion of touch.
From our previous cUscussion, we are foroed to limit
the term "menta.l energy" 'to intelleotual prooesses, to purely
psychioal processes requiring no admixture of material or physical elements.

This indicates our position regarding the

higher prooesses, namely: The soul is intrinsioally independent
of matter, although matter is a condition sine-qua-non for furnishing the soul "food for thought" in the form of sensuous reo-

46
presentations of objects and entities; in brief, the human soul
is merely extrinsica lly dependent on matter in cognitive prOw
cess es •
~

REOAPlTULATION OF PREVIOUS DISCUSSION BY DEFINITIONS.

McDougall, the former ps,riah of the scientific world because he
championed the existence of a soul, in his "Body and Mind" says

DEFINING NEGATIVELY:

2.

The soul is non-material, for it hs,s not
extension or ponderability; therefore,
it is not subject to the laws of
mechanis~
.
Non-mechanics.l te leo logical factors compel us to adopt the hypothesis of the
soul as an inextended immaterial
substance.

DEFINING POSITIVlLY:

1.
2.

The soul is a psychic being.
The soul is a substance, a sum of enduring capacities for thoughts, feelings,
and efforts of determinate kinds.
The soul is a unitary being or entity becs.use of unity of consciousness.
The soul,being Simple, undergoes no de.velopment during life, for its capacities
are fulq present as latent potentialities
from the beginning.
The mental differences exhibited by any
person at different stages of his life
would thus be wholly due to the f.evelopment during life of the bra,in and,
subsequent degenerative changes of
this brain structure. nbO

Now we have established an adequate foundation for
the study of human behavior in accord with the most exacting
requirements of scientific eaperimental psychology, and are
prepared to investigate the Soul, Consciousness and Mind, and
the Subject "I" or the Ego scientifically and psychologically.

J:MPtRIO PSYCHOLOGY.

DEnnD:

!}D::SCIJ:BOE; or' PSYCHIO OO_SOIOUS KOVEJlENT.

IS THE OONOEPT or SOUL ENTIRELY A NEGATIVE OONOEPT?

We have proved that psychology, in order to be a natural science, must deal not only with matter, but with a conscious self.

The Behaviorist, however, objects to a non-

material entity:
"But if the properties of this psychical
entity are only negative, that is, non-material, non-neural, non-chemical, etc., nothing is gained, and the principle, viz.,
that no new factors shall be assumed until
established principles have been demonstrated
to be in,dequate, seems the logical course to
follow. nol
At this point it is necessary to introduce a pertinent
discussion on "a,nalogous concepts and on negations, and their
contribution to scientific knowledge.
deny absolutely?
tive at times?

Does a negation always

Does not a negation furnish some thing posiWhen Behaviorism negated Titchenerism because

the latter was running unscientifically wlld, did it not ipso
facto produce a posl tive contribution for Psychology?

A negat-

ive statement does not always lmply a negatlve concept, e.g.,
when I assert that the Behaviorlst is not a Phllosopher or a
Sclentlst, I do not wish to assert that he ls not, that ls, tha

i

does not exist.

We must, therefore, conc lude that there are

some concepts, which although expressed negatively are

neve~

theless not a,bsolutely or purely nega.tive, but relatively or
indirectly produce a most positive concept, although it may be
an inadequate concept, e.g., of God, of the human soul, etc.
In scholastic terminology such concepts are called analogous or
negative-positive concepts.

Since these are very true concepts

it follows that the concept of the soul is true and so corresponds to reality.

In such wise are all spiritual substances

recognized by the human intellect which knows the spiritual being only indirectly through precisions and abstractions from
matter.

Such knowledge is negative under one aspect, and most

positive under another; it is imperfect scientific knowledge,
yet most true scientific knowlddge.
Professor Gruender of the

Depa~tment

of Psychology at

St. Louis University, in "Psychology without a Soul,· writes:
"The spiritual soul is a substance; that is
the positive element, it is, however, unlike
the material substance, it is 'im-material,'
i.e., not material; and this is the negative
element. But •• it is one thing to say that our
knowledge of a thing is imperfect, in fact very imperfect, and quite another thing to say
tha t we have .....lepuat no knowledge, no
knowledge at all. Those who reject all knowledge of the spiritual soul, because in our
present life it 18, and must necessarily be,
imperfect, do what a dissatisfied nurse is
warned not to do: they pour out the baby with
the bath,' as a German proverb has it. H02
Some wit has said, was it McDougall, they have even
discarded the bath-tubJ

1.
EMPIRIO PSYCHOLOGY

I.e CONSCIOUS KOTIOll AND THE SOUL.

That the Boul is not an entirely negative oonoept,
but that it signifies a positive reality, is the inevitable
conclusionf'drawn from the previous disoussion.

We will now

proceed to more positive experimental or empirioal data.
Human

beha~ior

proves the existenoe of the soul as

is testified by the universal experienoe of all men.

Suoh

human behavior is the sUbjeot-matter of experimental psyohology.

Here is a oonfirmation of the Soholastio and Dualistio

Posi tion produced and gra,nted by the Jehaviorist himself.

We

quote Professor Weiss:
"When the behavi.orist aotually tries to
determine whioh of these oonoeptions (i.e.,
the soul, either material or non-material)
has been most effeotive in impressing itself as a pedagogioal prinoiple in our eduoational praotioe, Stout's oonoeption that
mind is to be regarded as a non-material
causal agent (the funotional point of view)
approaches nearest to the one whioh prevai Js in actual 0 lass-room and every-day
praotice, no matter how much it mey be repudiated in the prefaoe of the tex~6bookS
or in the theoretioal disoussions." 3
Suoh pres*ing, stubborn human behavior implicitly and
explioitly vindicating the existence of a soul should give
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the Behaviorist warning not to fly "in the face of facts," not
to be out of step with human nature and human behavior.

His

province as a scientist is not primarily to refashion human beba vior but to study hunan behavior as it is.

TRUTH gI18ves him:

"After students have been carefully trained
to observe the fine distinctions involved in
the mind- body re lationtthlp, they forget them
a"S soon as they leave the university. When
they get into the business or professional
world, they adopt the popular conception of
an intelligent mind or consciousness residing
somewhere in the brain. The teacher who has
had the full quota of psychological courses,
talks as glibly of Iltraining the mind" and in
the same sene~, as one who has never hea.rd of
psychology. 110
The Behaviorist does not refer to true psychology but
to behavioristic psychology.

Popular psychology with its sim-

ple terminology is more correct than the behavioristic, Which
artificially and arbitrarily has simplified unscientifica.lly to
too grea.t a simplicity, and is back again 2000 yea.rs to the
Grecia.n cosmologistic philosophers, who were laying scientific
foundations and saw the most obvious, nothing but the material
world.

The unscientific Behaviorist studying human behavior

Bees matter, matter everywhere, but not a sign of sou IJ
Since the Behaviorist will not admit scientifically
the existence of the soul but is forced to attend to mind and
consciousness, our subsequent investlga.tion will be devoted to
these psychic

phenomen~

51

\ . . 2•

• EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY.
2. HUMAN BEHAVIOR, CONSCIOUSNESS & KIND.
CONSCIOUSBESS is awareness of the activities of the sel
Oonsciousness is awareness of the activities of the ensouled or
ganism.

It is cognition and recognition of such processes as

sens ing, imagining, fee ling, thinking and willing.
power of awareness, this consciousness, a Struoture?

Has this
According

to the Scholastic, it c8.nnotj for it is not organic, not ma.terial.

Is it, then, a distinct entity in the strict sense of th

term, a something existing in its own right?

Scholasticism has

been accused of mu).tiplying use less terms and so obfusoating
many an issue.

Let us first examine, then, What modern psy-

cho logists ho 1d.
This problem well merits prolonged aneJ1ysis.

Is con-

sciousness psychical as held by Structural Psychology, by the
School of Titchener?

arshall we hold that consciousness is a

something that has no physical properties, and that its psychic8.1 properties or attributes are (1) quality, (2) intensity, (3)
extent, and (4) duration?

\fill these attributes s'o fa.r enumera

ed suffice for a descriptive definition of oonsciousness?
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In the first place, Professor Stout maintains that
'oonsciousness itself is not susceptible of a positive definition. "65

Seoond~, Professor Weiss well interprets our modern

pSychological perplexities regarding mind and oonsciousness:
"If I have interpreted Wheeler 66 and
Fernberger 67 correctly, they both ho ld to
a monistio system and that a physical one.
They recognize, however, that in the ana,lysis of human achievement many fs,ctors
are unknown, and some of these fs,otors
seem to be sufficient Jy different from the
biophysics,l and biosocial facts that we do
know, that the old subjective terminology
is justified, but the dualism that originally went with it is not. nbS
How in the name of Science and

~gio

oan the Behavioris

in one and the same passage reoognize factors that differ eslentially from biophysical faotors, reoognize a manifest dualis
and then immediately deolare that dualism is inadmissible? This
is a plain oontradiction to preserve monistio and meohanistic
psychology and Unsciantifio Behaviorism.

The conclusion did

not follow from the premises cited; neither does the following:
"The Behaviorist concludes that if mental or
oonscious prooesses are regarded as particular
types of chemical or physioal processes of as
yet unknown oomposition, then only one entity
or one syltem of events need be assumed and
that it would be Simpler to admit that consOienoe, oonsciousness and mind are merely
terms that s,re used as substitutes for any
real knowledge of the events to whioh they
refer. 1169
.
And he would be justified and logical in holding this
conclusion were it not for the fact that mental prooesses are
not one s stem of events with physical processes or ohemical,

---------------------------------------------------------------.
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but processes of a higher and entirely different order which is
apparently altogether unknown to the -modern mind."

These two

essentially distinct orders, the physical and the mental, require a dualistic theory.

Any purely fonistic theory, therefor

is unreasonable and unsCientific, for it contradicts the facts.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND
WATSON AND CONSCIOUSNESS.

BEHAVIORIS~

Many a sincere psychologist

confessed before 1914 that burying the soul did the science of
psychology no good.
of

previou~

yet Watson did not learn from the mistakes

psychologists.

Let us follow his development:

(1) In his first book, "Psycho logy from the Standpoint
of a Behaviorist," published in 1914, he says:.
"The psychology begun by Wundt has fa.iled
to become a science because he onlI substituted • Consciousness , for 'Soul. '"(0
(2) At the time of his publication of "Behaviorism, An

Introduction to Comparative Psychology," he is indifferent to
Oonsciousness:
"One can assume either the presence or
absence of coneciousness ••• without affecting the problems of behavior by one jot or
one tittle. 1 7l

(3) But by September, 1927, Watson writes -The Myth of
the Unconscious" for Harper's Kagaaine, and says behavioristio8.l1y:

"The Behaviorist finds no 'mind' in his
laboratories, sees it nowhere in his subjects••• if the behaviorists are right, then••

••• there ce,n be no such thing as
consciousness. -72
This, then, is an example of the evolution of psycholOgy from the sta,ndpoint of the Beha,viorist Watson.

But from

the sta,ndpoint of any truly scientific psychologist it looks as
if all trace of psychology had thus fa,r been ca,refully left

out.

What rems.ins?

After studying Watsonian Behaviorism,

Ha,rvey Wickham in his book" "The Kisbehaviorists," tells us:
"Psychology is the study of the
conscious self. Doctor Watson says
not. He thinks that psychology is
the study of the reaction-mass. "73
And so Psychology has evolved into a study of
WEISS AND CONSCIOUSNESS.

By

PhySics~

1929, for Behaviorism

"Consoiousness as a non-physical,
spontaneous, self-initiating form of
energy does not exist.
Consciousness as an implioit form
of behavior or as an obscure physicochemical pr~cess is best described as
behavior. "7~
Wha,t argument or fact does the Behaviorist, Weiss, offer for making consciousness entirely physical?
"As soon as social organization and
social achievement had reached a certain stage the difference between man
and the animals seemed to be ,more than
a difference of anatomy and, physiology. "75
Darwinian evolution is here stated as a fact.

Is it a

fa,ct, or has contemporary Sclence discarded this untenable and
fanci~ul

hypothesis,

Prof. 'I'eias himself disbelieves it:

55
"Man was said to know, feel, perceive,
judge, and even create his universe.
Oogito, ergo SUIIl, does not seem to be an
animal reaction or the product of an automaton••• lt is this gap between animal and
man which behaviorism is trying to reduce
to pure 1y mechanical components, s,nd
against which traditional and6PoPular
psychology are most active. "7
The Behaviorist is trying to make the impossible possible.

We, therefore, conclude:
1. Behaviorism, according to Watson and
Meyers and Weiss, will never reduce the gap
between brute and man, between material and
spiritual; therefore Behaviori8m is attempting an impossible task.
2. For the gap is not one of mere complexity, but a, difference in KIND. Just as
vital and non-vital can never be identified,
nei ther can brute and man. Until black becomes whi te,and white becomes black under
precisely the same conditions, then and then
only, will brute ~come man, and man become
brute. BUt such a time will never come, for
contraries will ever rems,in opposed, and
therefore, two contraries can never both become true at the sa.me time under precisely
the same condi tions.
3. Therefore, Behaviorism throws reason
and logic a,nd science to the winds, and that
is why this thesis proves and maintains that
the scientific behaviorist ~ unscientific.
While we are on the Question of science in psychology,

it may

be

instructive to inquire for what scientific reasons

the Behaviorist ignores the mind and consciousness, and a forttori the substance underlying these functions, the human soul,
the study of which constitutes, real,
behav&Dr~stic

study.

honest-,;BC~eD.,tilf1c,'. human,

----------------------------------------------------------------,
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WHY DOES THE BEHAVIORIST IGNORE MIlD OR OONSOIOUSNESS?
~y

does the behavioristic psychology make an illicit transition

from the animistic conoeption of human behavior to the mechanistic?
"The behaviorist affirms that his science
is a study of the material, biological, mechanioal, and social antecedents that are at
the basis of human achievement ••• To speak of
investigating a non-material, non-biologioal,
non-mechanioal, non-causal entity has simply
no scientifio meaning."??
It has no scientifio meaning
for the Behaviorist perhap
,
He it is that is ignorant of an entity that oan put life into
our meohanical, lifeless psychology.
chology dynamio!

Only a soul can make psy-

What is it, may we ask, in human beings that

is dynamio, that is oonsoious?
"(I) Either the brain thinks, that is,
material substance is the substrate of
oonsoious prooesses;
.
(2) Or the noDimaterial thinks, that
is, the soul thinks;
(3) Or neither the mind nor the soul
thinks, but we have oonscious prooesses
alone.,,?t5
In this enumeration Koore has included all the possibilities.

Wundt held the view of consoious processes alone, a

position untenable, beoause we simply cannot conueive of aotion
without an aotor, aa motion without anything moving, or thought
without a thinker.
Given conscious prooesses, we must thereupon conclude
that these activities are manifestations of some underlying substance that is responsible for them.

Now this substanoe is

-
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either the brain or the soul; but the brain is material.

We

ehall now prove scientifically and experimentally with Professo
Moore that conscious processes a,re not activities of matter,
that ODnsciousness cannot be essentially brain activity.
If If identities are to be identical, and. explanations are to explain, we cannot identify our mental
life with chemical reactions (life with non-life) or
explain consciousness in terms of energy, which is
~erely that which moves 'a mass with a given velocity.
If one takes a mechanical view of life at its face
value, it is nothing but a series of chemical reactions in which mole oules, made of atoms, disintegra,te one by one and ne.. molecules are formed with
the elimination, or by the aid" of heat. Does this
view explain how a chemical reaction can be conscious
of itself, or how one chemical reaction can be consoious of another?"77

A dance of a,toms can never be identified with the senaation of red.
"The danoing atoms ha~e no identity whatsoever
with, they do not even bear a resemblance to, a
sensation. They cannot, therefore, expla,in even a
sensation, let alone the higher thought processes
and the !lctivity of the wilL If, therefore, there
must be some substrate of conscious processes, something whioh is active when the mind is conscious,
and if this oannot be a material substance, then
there must be a non-material substance, that is to
say, a spiritual substanoe or soul."7g
It has been said that psychology has lost, first its
soul, then its mind, and finally its consciousness, and so became mechanistic.

Let us not lose our mind but loose our mind,

let us be open-minded.

That is the real scientifio attitude.

Then we shall be oonscious of the fact that the mechanistic theory of today is driving us straight into the open arms of the
vitalistio theory of tomorrow!

THE DUALIST AND CONSCIOUSNESS.
~oiousness

must

be

Mind, then, and con-

regarded Bot as a material struoture of the

lumanbody but as a function of the soul.

No other position is

experimental psychology as we have demonstrated.

Ac-

~ena,ble

til

~ording

to this view, there is no consoiousness as a unitary

!tructure, but oonscious processes, not mind but mental processe
Lf we speak strictly and scientifically, not sensation but senBory processes, not pleasantness or unpleasantness, but only
affective processes, not a will but willing processes or activities of the soul.
regarded

8,S

Psychologically, all these processes must be

functions of one and the same essentially unchanging

soul.
THE DUALIST AND I1ID.

If mind is not a structure, if

it is not a substance, and if consciousness is a function of the
soul, what, then, is mind?

It, too, is a funotion of the soul.

How do mind and oonsciousness d1ffer?

oonscious processes, it is the

SUli. total

foroes controlling our human behavior.
structure?

M1nd is the tote,li ty of
of those non-me,ter1al
Is not mind, then, a

It is not, for the sum total of conscious processes

can never equal a strueuu.e.

Stout defines mind sim1larly:

fA m1nd is the unity of me.nif 0 ld
successive and simultaneous modes of
consciousness in an individual whole. "79
In other words, we can say with Titchener that mind is

the sum tote,l of conscious activities. activities of what?

!n experiencing self, the EGO.

This is our next topic.

Of

59

-. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY.

!3. HOKAN BEHAVIOR AllD THE "EGO."
Kind has been defined as the sum total of oonsoious aotivities.

But aotivities demand an aotor, a unity of past and

present oonsoious prooesses demand a unifying prinoiple, for
whioh, as we have proved, there is no room in the behavioristio
eleotron-proton evolutionary and meohanistio theory.
another stumbling-blook to the Behaviorist.

This is

Prof. Weiss writes:

"Professor Titohener more than any other
has proposed rigorous definitions for such terms as mind, oonsoiousness,
mental element, but inevitably some inner
aspeot, 'an experienoing self,' proves a
stumbling-blook against the uniformity in
aooepting or understa,nding the definitions
that are proposed. "SO
inv~stigator

It is not only a stumbling-blook, it is an insurmountable obstacle, it is beyond the understanding of the Eehavioris
How d.id Titohener, himself a orypto-materialist, dispose of that
"Experienoing Self1"

He annihilated

SOienoe, of Psychology}

it~

And alliin the name of

Professor Gruender summarizes well the

"annihilation of the Ego from Oonsoiousness" in his excellent
book "Psydhology without a Soul," in the ohapter entitled aptly:
II

~_-----------------------------------------------------------f
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THE ANNIHILATION OF THE "EGO" FROM PSYCHOLOGY IS THE
ANNEHILATION OF TRUTH IN THE NAME OF SCIENCE}

The Ego, that

well-known, directly known abiding entity, must go, must be
entirely eliminated from

psychology~

"But psychology, if it is to be a scientific psychology, cannot reoognize this
truth 70f the Ego/ a. we have heard Prof.
Titchener state. And he voices only the
general trend of thought among modern psychologists. The datum of scientific psychology is: Thought processes are gOing
on in the worl~ Scientific psychology
demands that menta·l phenomena be expressed
impersonal~ much as we say, for insta,nce,
it ra.ins. II
But why must the person, why must "I," the Ego, why
must this datum which is so unavoidable be excluded, and why
must merely impersonal datum be datum of scientific psychology?
Why can it not recognize the Ego, the substs.ntial principle of
thought?

Professor Gruender, who studied under Professor Tit-

chener, gives the following reason:
"The reason, we are told, is because the
object of scientific psychology is tmind, not
as popularly understood, but mind accessible
to experiment.' Prof. Titchener, however,
forgets that mind is really not accessible to
experiment except as a substantial prinCiple
of thought, expressed by the personal pronoun
tI'. For no men~l fact can be observed even
superficially, and still less be subjected to
experiments.1 research, except by means of
introspection or internal experience.. Every
act of introspection reveals the substantial
subject of consoious states, the EGO. 1152
Is this laSt statement true?

If it is, how is it pos-

sible for Titchener, introspeotion's champion, eliminattng all
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persona.li ty from his psychology, to eliminate the Ego?
challenge him to remove the ego from common parlance.

We
What

shall be the result.
"This /the presence of the Ego in introspection/
is so true, that even Prof. Titchener himself in
his supreme effort to eliminate the Ego from the
expression of internal experiences in that speoimen of scientific language which engaged our attention•• ('Mind splits up into consciousnesses,
the breakfast-consciousness, the newspaper-andcorrespondence-consciousness, etc. I) was obliged
to prefix the Ego of antediluvian days in the
shape of the pluralis majesta.ticus: ITo put the
matter crudely, It begin the day with a gettingup consciousness. Ng3
And so we must agree with Prof. Gruender who must agree
with Prof. Titchener, that this is putting the matter crudely,
in fact, very crude ly, if indeed the personal pronoun must
needs be excluded from the terminology of scientific psychology.
If Scientific Behaviorism or scientific psychology denies at the very outset the SUbstantial principle of thought,
the Ego or the Experiencing Self, that psychology commits a
suicidal blunder.
THE "EGO" AND THE DUALIST.

Wha,t are the experimental

facts of personal experience, of being conscious of the Ego in
action? Can these be verified whenever desired?

A comprehensiv

yet brief description which answers these question has been
nished to us

by

the ProfeBsor of Experiments.l Psychology at St.

Louis University, whose psychology recognizes the existence of

. the soul:

62
"I am able to observe and study my own
thoughts, I can make the reasoning process
and my own reasoning Ego, the subject of my
study. Tte marvellous part of this introspective activity of our mind is the perfect identity of the thinking sUbject and
the object of thought. This power of introspection is one of the main sources of rational psychology and the conditio-sine-qulr
non of empirioal psychology ••• "gLt.
The next psychological fact punctures materialism.
"Now this mental phenomenon (the fact of
perfect psychological reflexion) finds no
ana.logon in the realm of the material world;
nay more, it is in direct oPPosition to the
known properties of matter ••• that an atom
act upon itself is repugne.nt to the known
nature of matter. Yet every hypothesis,
making the brain the organ of introspective.
thought, meets precisely with the difficulty
just mentioned."S5
What, then, does psychology with a soul and with an
Ego maintain scientifically by experimentation by means of
introspection?
"Through psychological reflexion we
never perceive the Ego except in some
act of cognition or volition, sensitive
or rational ••• A thought or volition without 'a SUbject is never met with in our
experience; we always perceive the thought
and volition in the concrete, i~e., the
Ego thinking, the Ego willing. "06
A study of human behavior, therefore, convinces us that

we always catch the Ego in
is no human activity.

actio~

Destroy the Ego and there

The Ego with its power of Introspection

will ever remain the pi1lar, the sine-Qua-non condition of
Experimental, or more strictly spee.king of Empirical Psychology

OHAPTER V.

"SOIENTIFIO BEHAVIORISM" IS UNSOIENTIFIO.
1. UNSOIENTIFIO BEHAVIORISTIO POSTULATES.

Is the galax

of postulates of the Soientifio Beha.viorist soientifio?

Here i

nebtibus a,rray of nebulous Behavioristic "postulates:"
"(1) I assume that a reformation of the
psychological postulates is jU8tified,
if it/Behaviori8m/ establishe8 a methodo logy which rep laces the mind- body dua 1i8m by a systematic monism ba8ed on the
aS8umptions of the physica.l sciences. ·g7
This thesis has proved the impo8sibility of the replace
ment of the mind-body dualism by systematic materialistic and
mechanistic Monism.

The Behaviorist Weiss "postulates It that

"( 2) the postula,tes are a8sumed to
forms of motion. "gg

be

Materialistic monism has never justified this ancient
assumptio~

The Scholastic philosopher might ask: "How can an

immaterial being move from place to place if it is not in a
place?"

But this question wodld be

~yond

the comprehension of

Ma.teria.listic Beha.viorism.
"(3) The universe is the sum of the movements of its funda,mental elements, the
electrons and protons."g9

This thesiS haa demonstrated the existence of

no~

-
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material entities in the world, and consequently the Behavioristic world-view of the universe is inadequate.

"Ol) The totality of these evolving dyna.mic
electron-proton systems: /evolving from/
free electrons and. protons,
atomic types of organization,
mo lecular types,
inorganic crystalline types,
organic protoplasmic types,
Unicellar types of organization,
Multicellular or organismic types;
these in turn evolve into the
Compound fUlticellular or social types of
organi1.ation•••
The tota.li ty of these dynamic elec troIlproton interactions forms the movement
continuum, or the Cosmos. "90
This thesis has

411~i'''.4

the assumptions of such a

Materialistic and Darwinian Evolution.

The basic assumption

of such an Evolution is that the Oosmos originated and evolved
entirely and only by Chance.

If the Scientific Behaviorist wil

prove to us tha.t by casting alphabetical block he can !2I.chance
compose a Shakespearean drama, then we shall believe him when h
a.Bsumes and "postulates" that this Universe, this orderly Cosmo
evolved by

chance~

"SCIEHTIFIC BEHAVIORISMII IS UNSOIENTIFIC.
2. Unscientific BEHAVIORISTIO COROLLARY.
It is evident that Science is not Mathematics , neither
does Psychology with its study 'of vital behavior and human actions and reactions become identica.l with Mathematics.

But the

Scientific Behaviorist evolves an unscientific corollary from
his unscientific assumption of electron-proton evolution.
II Tradi tiona I psycho logy regards man as
being controlled by a sort of spirit man
within the physical man and that the mea. surement of human achievement is the measuring of so-cs.lled processes as s.ttention,
perception, wishes, volitions, images, etc.
The behaviorist regards man as a link
in the cha,in of physical processes which
make up the universe and with this assumption goes the corollary that the measur~
ments of human behavior and of human achievement are of the s~me order as
physical measurements."~l

It is a fact that to some modern scientists Science is
Identified with MathematiCS.
are not

We repeat: Science and Mathematici

synonymous~

This is a fundamentally erroneous corollary evolved
from the hppothesis, whioh today is untenable, that man is a
machine, nothing more nor less than a complex automaton made up

----------------------------------------------------------------,
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of nothing but billions of e1eotrons and protons arranged by
chanoe and maintained by ohanoe in most marvellous oonfigur8tions as yet unfathomed by Physioal Soienoe.
In this thesis we have demonstrated that Empirioal
psychology oan never be identified with Physios or Mathematics,
for human behavior does not without exception always fall into
the category of Matter.

It should be evident to Behavioristic

psycho logists that Psychology needs a different measuring-stick
for such processes as thinking and willing than a yard-stick or
micrometer rule.

lor Psyoho1ogy there is none other, espe-

cially in the realm of Introspection or Ref1exion, that is or
ever will

be

available while human nature and human behavior

remain what they are, than the Oonsoious Ego, than this discarded Experiencing Ego, without which even the yard-stick or
the micrometer rule would be useless.

"SCIENTIFIC BEHAVIORISM" IS UNSCIENTIFIC.
,

3. UNSCIENTIFIC BEHAVIORISTIC ETHICS.
The Behavioristio Psychologist beoomes and evolves into
in Ethioal Philosopher. Here is the treatment on the Ethios of
luman behavior whioh does no oredit to Scientifio Behaviorism.
iere is the evidenoe,

q~oted

from Weiss' Behavioristic Theory:

"If the assumption that a rigid. mechanism may
underlie huma.n behavior and human aohievement
has a probability suffioiently high to receive
scientifio recognition, then in the formulation
of the future program of sooial oontrol there
will be a reaction against some of the norms
whioh have been develo:Qed under a traditional and
nonscientifio ethios."~2
This is not soientifio, this is ridiculous}

There is

lot the probability of one ohanoe in a trillion that this Cosmos

las evolved aocording to rigid meohanistio and Darwinistic "pos-

tula.tes."

But the Behaviorist is undaunted, he is brave, he

thinks that his theory may some day attain "a probability suf-

riciently high to reoeive soientific recognition." Muoh l! ss

Ghis being Scienoe, it is not even gambling, for the Behaviorist

laS not even a gambler's chanoe for his dreams to come true.
Sinoe meohanistio behaviorism is non-soientific be-

6S
it is erroneous to maintain that man has evo lved from "primeval
007.e ll and nothing more, such erroneous and unscientific psychology is not entitled to generate and evolve scientific beR.vioristic ethics.

Scientific ethics must ever be based upon

a true knowledge of human nature.

It is a historictllly t1nde-

niable fact that human nature is essentially fixed, and so it
follows that morality a.nd human ethics in their fundamental
principJe s are fixed essentially and eternally.

But the :Be-

haviorist, Weiss, believes in ethical evolution also.
"Extending the time limi tsbackward to
the beginning of the species homo sapiens,
anthropologists would probably predict increasing variability. This seems to speak
against the stable equilibrium principle
and against the probability of an unchanging norm for human behavior. ,,93
No need to remark more than that some of our modern
Anthropologists, as prophets of Darwinian Evolution, have turn
out to be· Fa,]se Prophets.
believes them.

But the Behaviorist unscientifically

He ba.ses his entire science of Behaviorism upon

their predictions, upon the "Variability" of their shifting
sands:
Of the four types of theories presented,
the VARIABIIlTY theory ••• based upon life
from non-life ••• seems to conform best with
the facts found in the evolution of human
behavior••• ""
We must interrupt such nonsense.' Darwin and Huxley a.nd
If

Speneer and Stanley Hall have introduced nothing but erroneous
found!ttions when they propounded the theory of Uni linear
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Evolution, life from non-life•. The

work~

of Kiroher, Loeuwen-

hoek, Sohwan, Spallanzani, Pasteur and Tpndall have given the
dea th- blow to that false hypothesis: "All lI1fe from non-life."
The only soientifio faot that we know regarding Evolution, whio
is inoontrovertible, is: "All life from life."

Interpreted

negatively, this means: "No life from non-life."
But Professor Weiss logioally oonoludes:
"The variability theory seems to oonform
best with the faots found in the evolution
of human behavior, and the behaviorist.'s
problem thus beoomes that of showing that
this varia.bili ty may be a meohanioal funotion of biophysioal and biosooial oauses. "95
The unsoientifio aspeot ani the 'immoral' probabilities
of the Behavioristio quest, engender a soruple in the mind of
the Behaviorist:
If If norma,li ty is measured by th~ degree
of stability of the speoies, the terms fOOd
and bad mean something different than i
normi'l'rty between internal and external
relations is based upon the extension of
geographio range, or on an inorease of population. There are strong objeotions
against introducing ethioal implioations
into animal behavior but in the faoe of
the fruitfulness of the phylogenetio method
in the study of human behavior, this objeotion is likely to vanish. 1196

We leave the Behaviorist with his soruple.

Whatever

the Behaviorist 'may be, psychologist, philosopher, ethician, one
thing is sure---and it i8 precisely this that our thesis aimed
to prove---THE "SOIENTIFIO BEHAVIORIST" IS NOT SOIENTIFIO.
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"SOIENTIFIC BEHAVIORISM" IS UNSOIENTIFIC.

4. UNSOIENTIFIC

BEHAVIORIS~IC

BIAS.

After lauding natural soienoe, Prof. Weiss says:
"From sooia1 soienoe we have seoured better
organization, better training, but we have
scaroely started on the pa.th of an equitable
distribution among individuals of the benefits of scienoe. For too many of us more
machinery means less leisure. The benefits
of science are wasted upon a few at the
expense of the many. "97
This knowledge is oommon property. But
"The benefits of soience are wasted upon
a few at the expense of the many. This is
a vestige of the type of ethics in whioh
every individual was rega.rded as the servant of some superhuman being or foroe by
whom or by whioh his social status was determined at the time of his birth."9g
Professor Weiss is not speaking here as a Scientist
and Psychologist but as an EthicianJ

He is planning a program

out of his own specialty; he is plainly beyond his ken.

He

seems to have confused Nietzsohe's Superman with the All-Perfe
BeingJ

His thesis is untenable in the light of the historical

researoh of our own day.

His attitude has been oharacterized

as a "conspiracy against the truth."
tage of the Protestant Revolution.

It is a "spotted" heriIt is an unscientific a.t-

titude of a materialistic and mechanistio "soience."

OHAP TJ:R VI.
SUMMARY and
I.

OONCLUSION.

A problem and conflict arise when the Behaviorist

explicitly condemns all other psychologists as unscientific,
and declares himself to be the only scientist and psychologist
who studies human behavior

scientifically~

lenged and investigated in this thesis:
Behaviorist Scientific?"

This claim is chal-

"Is the 'Scientific'

The two conflicting theories

regardinl~

the basis of human behavior are presented and ana1yze4: (1) the
position of the Behaviorist, who is a materialistic and mechanistic Monist, and (2) the position of the Dualistic Vitalist.
II.

These positions eVidently are fundamentally con-

tradictory; therefore, one must be false.

We disoover that in

defining his ultimate basic position and fundamental principle
the Behaviorist makes the fatal error of confusing a postulate,
which is a proved fact, and an assumption, which is an unproved
hypothesia.
III.

The opposition between the Monistic tehaviorist

and the Dualistic Vi tal1st i8 essentially and fundamentallJ a
conflict between Hylomorphic Dualism and rigorously deterministiC, evolutionary mechanistiC, and "scientifically" Darwin-
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iatic, electro-protonistic, ontogenetically and phylogeneticall
reca.pi tularistic, unequivocally Behavioristic Monism.
to the Behaviorist, human behavior is merely the energy of phy
ical motion which can

be

calculated and determined and predicte

with metaphysical and absolute mathematical precision.

This

position manifestly contradicts every-day experience regarding
the freedom of individual human behavior.

The Vitalist, there-

fore, relying upon direct experience and soientifically Je gitimate empirical data, does soientifioally maintain that a part

0

human behavior is undenia"bly free and is physically and morally
undetermined before the aot is posited.

He is supported in his

view by Common Sense furnishing to his Thesis the Universal Co
sent of Mankin,.

He, the Dualistio Vitalist, is the ohampion

0

this Popular Psyohology, which is refined but unchanged essentially by Empirical,

E.xperime~tal,

or Rational Psyohology.

Reviewing the History of Psyohology with its materialistic errors, from the time of Plato and Aristotle through St.
Thomas Aquinas and Meroier to this our day to whom human behavior and So ientific Psyoho logy was an absorbing problem, we can
see clearly tha,t, in order to avoid erros and really explain hu
man behavior, we are forced to aooept the hylomorphio theory of
matter and soul, of these two prinoiples, one of whioh is material and inaotive, and the other is spiritual and dynamio. This
theory does not admit that deadly epigram: "All life from nonlifeJ" which the Behaviorist acoept unquestioningly, but Which

r
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IV.

Next, the scientific, psychological views of the

Behaviorist and Vitalist are contrasted and investigated as to
their scientifio validity and degree of cogency when the following problems are analyzed:
1. The sUbject-matter of General Psyohology.
2. The subject-matter of Empirice,l Psychology.
This Speoial Psychology, experimenting with a human being and
his behavior, demands a study of:
1. Human behavior e,nd the vi tal principle, or Soul.
2. Human behavior and Oonsciousness or

Min~

3. Humen behavior and the Experienoing Subject,Ego.
This scientific investigation reveals the fact that the

Behaviol~

ist does not do what he promised and set out to do, namely,to
explain the phenomena of human baha,vior; he $i ther denies these
phenomena or deliberately ignores them.
V.

This concluding chapter reviews facts and arguments

previously offered.

Its conolusions prove beyond the least

possibility of doubt that the "Scientific" Behaviorist is
ama!ingly unscientifio in his study of human behavior, with his
1. Unscientific postulate, which is an assumption
believing mechanistio and darwinistio evolution as true;
2. Unscientific corolla,ry, believing all of huma.n
behavior to be physical motion and mathematically sure;
3. Unscientific morality, of the laissez-faire,
individualistic, godless type, theoretioally discarded;
4. Unscientific ~rejudioe, denying ~d and deifyins
Man. The Behaviorist should know that only a fool says
in his heart: "There is no God.'''

APPENDI OES.

PROLOGtJJ:.
Oatholic Psychology is Scientific Psychology because
it is true and universal.

Other psychologies, as, for example,

Behaviorism, are only partially true, because they only discern
the human in man and are blind to the divine in him.

In the

following appendices, it is my intention to discuas human behavior in so far as it is an imitation or participation of Divine
behavior, for human life is essentially an imitation or participation of Divine LifeJ

The BehaTiori8t denies God and recog-

nizes only mechanical energy to be a fact in human behavior;
the Vitalist knows that man has life, but that God is Life,
and he knows that energy eXists, but that God is the EnergistJ
Since the phenomenon "Motion" is characteristic of
a.ll life, and since the Behaviorist has confused vi tal motion
with physical motion until he has identified material and psychic motiona, we propose, with God's help, to discuss:

L Human behavior is vital action, is vital motion.
2. Does motion prove the existence of God?
3. Whence co_S vital motion?

APPENDIX I.
WHETHER HOllAN BEHAVIOR IS PROPERLY VITAL :MOTIO!?

Vital motion demands life.

What is life? To answer,

we musk ask first: "What beings have life?"

Considering the

characteristics of living beings in the world around us, it is
clear to us that those beings are properly called living that
move themselves by some kind of motion, whether this motion is
properly so called or motion in a more general sense,

8.S

when

predicated of the act or "energeia" of a perfect thing, as
"understanding" and "feeling" are calle d motion.
all things are said to

be

motion or operation of any
And what is life?

Accordingly,

alive that determine themselves to
kin~

To live is nothing else than to

exist in this or that nature, and life signifies this living
or existing, though in the abstract.
Hence, to say that a thing is alive is to predicate of
it something substantial and not merely accidental.

Sometimes,

however, life is used less properly for the operations ffom
which its name is taken.

In all events, life implies some kin

of se If-movement.
Has man life? Bot only haa man life, but he has it in
the highest degree of all .isible creation.

To prove that thi
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is true, let thet:ehavior of living things

produced as true

be

experimental evidence.

In this discussion, living motion will

be emphasized.

be

It must

noted that "motion" here is used in

a techaical sense, namely, the passage or transit from one
state or stage to another state.

Thus, it may be said that

different phs.ses of living behavior, d.ifferent living phases
of actiTity are different living motions.

It may further be

sa.id, that the more perfect is vi tal behavior, the more perfect is this vital or psychic motion.
In the lowest order of living things, at the very bottom of the scaDa of psychic activity and vital movement are
the plants, beings which have characteristically immanent action of bodies endowed with a psychic or vital principle, but
which do not feel or understand or wilL

By

immanent action

is meaat that plants operate from within, that is, that they
move themselves, when this term is used in our technical senae,
namely, the passage from one state to another.

Casual observ-

ation of plant behavior is sufficient to convince anyone that
these beings possess the characteristics of living things, suo
move.ents as nutrition, growth, reproduction, regeneration,
decay a,nd many other anabolic and katabolic processes.
But plants possess only one of the three specific mov
ments of living things.

Specifically, these three movements

are vegetation, sensation, intellection.

That plants lack

powers of cognition must be conceded until experimental or
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objeotive evidenoe prove the oontrary.
In a higher order must be olassified the vital movements of animals.

Ordinarily,- an animal is said to live when

it moves itself; and as long as suoh motion appears in it, it
is oonsidered to be alive.

By

its own natural powers, an animal

moves itself from plaoe to plaoe.

Its aotivity, therefore, is

also immanent, a. oharaoteristic of living beings alone.

Suoh

operations e,re called immanent and manifest vita.l aotivity whose
prinoiples are within the operator.

In virtue of its vital

prinoiple the animal produoes a oharaoteristio, animal operation
of whioh the plant is inoapable, namely, movement from plaoe to
p laoe or locomot ion.
But animals possess a still higher type of vital motion; they manifest sense cognition.

Their end organs for

nizing sensible objects are analogous to human organs.

co~

To deny

sense oogni tion to anima.ls as a property endowed them by nature
is to render their looomotion purposeless.
It has litewise been observed that the more perfect
the sensorium of animals, the more perfeot is their power of
self-movement.

Such as have only the sense of touoh move so

slowly as to be almost indistinguishable from plants; whereas
such as have true sense power besides touoh, not merely oognise
objeots in oontaot with thea, but objeots apart from themselves.
As these animals can oognize objeots at a distanoe, they are
found to possess locomotive powers in proportion so that they

78
call move themselves to considerable distances by progressive
contractions and relaxations.
A more perfect degree of live and psychic motion is
found in intelligent beings.

That which progresses by a rea,-

soning process from a principle to a conclusion, or from concrete and specific instances to a general law, can be said to
possess a higher species of psychic motion.

If, further, in

such beings, understanding is considered as a species of psychic motion, of a psychic transit from one state to another,
that which understands undubi tably itself 1s llIery properly
said to move itself.

Such movement is characteristically hu-

man movement; therefore, human behavior is properly vital
motion.

APPENDIX II.
DOES KOTION PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF GOD?
There are two kinds of movements or actions or motions,
transient and immanent.

In transient action a being effects a

transference of energy from itself to another, energy goes out
of it to a.nother and so effects a cha.nge in some external matter, as in heating or cutting; in immanent motion, the action
rema,ins in the agent, as in acts of understanding, willing, or
feeling.

Tra,nsient a.ction is a perfection of the thing moved,

not of the mover.

Immanent action is a perfection of the agent.

Immanent action is called movement because of its similarity to
transient action.

Tra.nsient movement, the only one the Behavi-

orist sees and properly cognizes, i8 something imperfect, something which exists potentiallY.

Immanent movement is a perfec-

tion and is not potential, but actual.

Motion in this second

sense belongs most properly to God, Je ss properly to man.

God

moves Himself, and man imitates God in this behavior, inasmuch
as that which understands itself is said to move itself.
motion, that is IlIIIIlanent Movement

be longs

And so

most properly to God,

and is less perfect in man.
The argument for the existence

of God can be proposed
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according to the "duns.mis" and flenergeia" theory of Aristotle,
or potency and act of St. Thomas. let the Behaviorist here not

-

that Aristot Ie's "energeia" is toto coelo different from the
mechanistio, physics.1 and material energy of Modern Soienoe.
We enunciate the principle: "Whatever is moved, is
moved by something else" (quid.luid movetur, ab a1io movetur.)
This prinCiple mea,ns that nothing moves itself when used in
the widest sense, or that whatever moves from one term to any
other term is moved by another thing.

It strictly means (a.nd

so is here aocepted) that whatever passes from "dunamis" to
"energeia", i.e., from potency or potentiality to aot, must be
aotuated by something else.
As regards living beings in this life we admit that
they have movement of the.se 1ves, but only part ia 11y and imperfectly.

In some way or other they require something else,

at 1e ast to initiate the movement, even though it be self-move
mente

Moreover, in so far as they come into being and thus

pa.S8 ex potentia in actum, they require something distinct
from themselves, according to the above principle.
It is God, the Universal Mover (Plato) Who gives motion to all beings.

He alone does not move in the sense of

passing from potency to act, He is therefore the Motor Immobili
(Aristotle); but Be does move most Perfectly in the sense that
He understands and wills most perfectly.

Therefore, God is at

once the Prime and Ultimate MOTer of all being, Himself being
unmoved, 8.nd Perfection Hillse1f moving Himself alone.'

APPENDIX III.

WHENCE OOKES VITAL MOTION?
The Behavlorlst is seeklng the anawr to human behavlor
and to all vltal motlons ln matter, "In

mu~'n

Wl1~he

find ltl

If ouw prevlous proofs are true, and they are, the beglnnlng
and end of llfe, the Alpha and Omega of Llfe and of human behavior ls God, the MOtor Immobllls} For God ls llfe and Life i.
God.

Behavior and Motion in the most perfeot sense, wl th no

admlxture of matter or any other imperfeotlon 1s found in God
alone.

If the Behavlorist wishes to study pure and unadulterat

ed motion, here is his opportunity - let him study Perfeot Motion, let him study the Perfeot Mover, God HimselfJ The Llfe of
All Living.'
"Seek llfe wherever one wlll, lt wlll be found ln no
one but God. Draw f the bolt of Nature's seorecies t; study the
'swlft lmportings on the wllful faoe of skies. t Life ls not
there.
"Rejolce ln the evening, when she lights 'her gllmmering tapers round the day'. dead sanotlties. I Life ls not there.
"Laugh 'in the morning's eyes~' Triumph and sadden
'with all weather'; weep wlth ~aven and make its 'sweet tears'
'sa,l t' with your own. Life is not there.
"Lay your heart to beat agalnst 'the red throb of' the
'sunset-hea,rt ••• and share oommingllng heat.' Life is not there.
"Delay the quest for life until 'mangled youth lies
dead beneath the heap' of years and days 'have orackled and
gone up in smoke.' Life is not there.
"Go out beyond thls 'mlst of tears' and 'running
laughter,' travel 'across the margent of the world,' trouble

g2

the 'gold gateways of the stars,' smite 'for shelter on their
clang~d bars, t • • • 'rise from this valley of death,' repose not,
rest not in this imperfect communion of created life with created life; be satisfied only where 'hid battlements of eternity
are reached, where there is life which is the Infinite Communio
'of the Infinite with Itself, the Original Life of all Beings,
the Eternal Life whence has emanated all thatlives---God",the
LIFE OF ALL LIVING. the Life of all living. By it the angels
are immortal; but It our souls have an imperishable existence;
by It the animals move and grow; by It the plants have their
being.
"If It should disappear all earthly life would fall into nothingness for all life on this globe is borrowed. Life is
not a push from below but a gift from above; human life is not
a perfection of a,nimal life; it is an imperfect representation
of Divine Life. There is no spontaneous generation in this
world, either naturally or supernaturally. Life must come from
Life.
"When we return to It we li#e, when we depart from It
we die---and that Life---the Divine Life---the only Life, the
Life which all seek, many without knowing it, is the LIfE OF
GOD, the Life wherein all life rests; the father, Son and Holy
Ghost to Whom be all honor and glory forever."
(Ref. - THE LIFE OF ALL LIVING - Rev. Fulton J. Sheen, pp.35-g

L. D. S.
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